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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON STUDENT LOANS, HIGHER EDUCATION AND INEQUALITY
Marc Folch Cordoncillo
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde
This dissertation consists of two essays at the intersection of the economics of education and
inequality. The first chapter analyzes how increasing levels of student debt affect career and
housing choices of bachelor’s degree recipients in the United States. Using within-cohort
across-school variations in financial aid policies, it shows that higher student debt balances
cause a front loading of earnings, lower earnings growth, lower graduate school enrollment,
and earlier entry into home ownership. Then, a life-cycle model is estimated to analyze
the mechanisms behind the interaction between student debt, career and housing choices.
The structural model shows that post-school credit constraints generate a trade-off between
career and housing choices for highly indebted graduates, playing a key role in explaining
lifetime earnings inequality. Relative to the baseline 10-year fixed repayment plan, an income based repayment plan (or a more ambitious student loan forgiveness plan) increases
human capital accumulation and earnings growth, while postponing entry into home ownership. The second chapter studies the evolving role of the higher education market in shaping earnings inequality in the United States. Using detailed institution-level data linked
to administrative students earnings records, I document an increasing trend in post-school
earnings inequality among students attending different four-year colleges and universities
between 1997 and 2009. I then estimate the school quality production function as a composite of instructional expenditure per student and average (and dispersion of) students
ability. The point estimates suggest that college readiness has a higher weight on explaining variation in post-school earnings relative to expenditure per student. Finally, I show
a growing variation in both quality inputs, consistent with an increase in inequality in net
tuition revenue and increasing relative demand for private non-profit doctoral universities.
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CHAPTER 1 :

Go Big or Buy a Home: Student Debt, Career Choices and Wealth Accumulation

This chapter is co-authored with Luca Mazzone.

1.1. Introduction
Student loans have become the new normal for bachelor’s degree recipients in the United
States1 . Between 1993 and 2016, the percentage of students who had borrowed at any time
during their undergraduate years rose from 45 percent for 1993 graduates to 68 percent for
2016 graduates (Figure 1.1). Among borrowers, the median cumulative amount borrowed
rose from $13,000 to $27,000 in real terms, with 25% of graduating seniors having borrowed
more than $40,000 in 2016. Student borrowing is now more likely to be a burden for a
higher percentage of college graduates and a relevant factor they take into account in their
economic and financial decisions2 .
In presence of credit constraints, student debt affects post graduation choices by making further borrowing more difficult. We highlight one often overlooked cost of additional
investment in human capital for college graduates, that is the postponing of first-time
home-ownership. As enrollment in graduate school generally implies increasing student
loan balances, the relative value of additional human capital investment decreases throughout the life cycle due to strong horizon effects induced by home-ownership. Thus, when
housing is taken into account, the negative impact of student debt on human capital accumulation is amplified, causing lower earnings growth and lifetime earnings for bachelor’s
degree recipients with higher levels of student debt.
1
Most of the increase in undergraduate student debt has been attributed to the substantial rising cost of
college over the last decade (see Looney and Yannelis (2015)). Between 1993-2016, median real net cost
of college increased 3% for 4-year college seniors (see Figure A1.1). Increasing federal loan limits as well
as a relaxation of eligibility criteria helped to moderate the impact of higher cost on college enrollment.
2
Although real incomes for bachelor’s degree recipients rose as well, monthly student loan payment as a
percent of monthly income (one year after graduation) also increased between 1993 and 2008 (see Figure
A1.2).

1

Figure 1.1: Percentage and Cumulative Amount Borrowed for BA Degree

Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 1993/94, 2000/01, 2007/08
and 2015/16 Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study (B&B:93/94, B&B:2000/01, B&B:2007/08,
B&B:2015/16). Cumulative amount borrowed for undergraduate studies includes all loans ever borrowed for
undergraduate education (excludes Parent PLUS loans, which are only available to the parents of dependent
undergraduates). Loan value adjusted using the annual Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) provided by the U.S.
Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics. The portion of the box plot is defined by two lines at the
25th percentile and 75th percentile with boundaries at the 10th percentile and 90th percentile.

We use the Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study (B&B), a restricted access
dataset compiled by the National Center for Education Statistics. The B&B surveys cover
a representative sample of U.S. college graduates interviewed on successive waves.
In order to empirically examine how college borrowing affects earnings, career and housing
choices in the years after graduation, we need to overcome notorious identification problems,
as the amount borrowed may be determined by unobserved individual characteristics, which
in turn would affect all post graduation choices. On the one hand, if low ability students
are less likely to receive grants or come from a low-income background, the OLS estimator
will reflect the latent negative correlation between ability and student borrowing. On the
other hand, students with higher earnings expectations could be more willing to borrow,
resulting in debt being positively selected.
2

We address the identification problem by introducing an instrument based on variations
in colleges’ financial aid. Composition of aid at the college level is calculated using public
access data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). We focus
on institutional grants, which are funded from net revenues and assets and experience
significant variations year-by-year for many institutions. We use these supply changes in
financial aid during college enrollment to extract variation in student debt that is not
correlated with post bachelor choices through unobserved students characteristics.
Our empirical results suggest that lower net wealth amplifies the trade-off between career
and housing choices for college graduates. Higher levels of student debt cause a front
loading of earnings, while significantly and persistently deterring additional human capital
investment (measured as graduate school enrollment). This, in turn, contributes to lower
earnings growth. Indebted graduates earn 0.29% more for each percentage increase in
student debt in the first year. Over time, this effect is compensated by wage growth being
0.1% lower. We also find that higher levels of student debt generate an earlier entry into
home ownership, consistent with lower graduate school enrollment for college graduates.
We develop a model with endogenous (risky) human capital accumulation enriched by career
choices and housing decisions to rationalize the empirical evidence and understand the
importance of credit constraints in shaping post graduation outcomes. After graduating
from college, individuals enter the labor market and are heterogeneous in innate ability,
human capital, liquid wealth and student debt. They sequentially decide on human capital
investment, savings, non housing and housing consumption while they pay for student debt.
At any point, they can enroll in a post bachelor program3 and, if they do, take on additional
student debt. Workers can buy a house through a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage as long as
they make a down-payment and their debt payments do not exceed a proportion of their
income.
3

More than one third of Bachelor’s degree graduates hold a graduate degree (Master’s, Professional school
or Doctorate degree) at age 35-40 (see Figure A1.3) for recent trends in graduate school attainment.

3

Our theoretical framework implies that, because of introducing debt-funded human capital
and post-college housing credit constraints, student debt plays a key role in explaining
earnings inequality throughout the life cycle. College graduates with higher student debt
balances sort into careers with lower compensation for human capital accumulation, and
then experience lower earnings growth but earlier entry into home ownership. As enrollment
in graduate school implies more educational debt, indebted college graduates anticipate
that investing more in human capital might imply a substantial delay in first-time homeownership, as they might later face borrowing constraints in the mortgage market.
The model is estimated by Simulated Method of Moments using a combination of data from
B&B and Current Population Survey (CPS). Structural estimation highlights substantial
non monetary returns to post bachelor education, that yields consumption-equivalent utility
consisting of more than $50, 000. On the other hand, skill premium for the post bachelor
degree educated workers corresponds to 14% of the earnings differential with respect to
workers with just a bachelor degree. Individuals with relatively higher ability are thus able
to afford the cost of higher education given the mentioned composition of returns, while
others postpone or choose the alternative career path.
The model also speaks to the effects of borrowing on home ownership. On the one hand,
college graduates who choose a career with a steeper earnings path (as is the case for
those who enroll in graduate programs) are at the same time more likely to postpone their
investment in housing. On the other hand, workers that choose to remain in a career that
implies lower earnings growth consider housing a relatively more attractive investment.
Hence, home ownership is relatively higher for young graduates that started their career
with more student debt, a finding consistent with our empirical results. Credit constraints in
the housing market for highly leveraged households are crucial in determining these results.
These results point to an easy counterfactual exercise that helps highlighting the way in
which, conversely, housing affects career sorting. In a setting without home ownership, distortions to human capital accumulation induced by student debt are smaller, enrolment in

4

post bachelor programs is higher, and lifetime earnings inequality decreases. The main reason for this effect is that postponing homeownership is costly: higher debt forces graduates
to postpone additional education, or to invest less in human capital to accumulate higher
savings. While doing so, workers realize that enrolling at a later age would mean a further
postponement of homeownership, as the downpayment and/or debt-to-income constraints
would likely bind for an even longer period of time, and choose to give up on additional
education and choose careers with a flatter income profile.
Finally, we use the model to evaluate the impact of the recent widespread adoption of income based repayment plans (IRP) and compare it to a forgiveness plan. We find that
the introduction of the IRP provides the foundation for reducing the unintended consequences of student loan debt. By lowering an individual’s monthly payments, IRP provides
a consumption smoothing mechanism that reduces the need to choose a higher paying job.
The implementation of a forgiveness plan and the widespread adoption IRP yield similar
outcomes, both increasing enrollment in graduate programs and earnings over the life cycle.
In both cases, however, alleviating the debt burden does imply a delay in homeownership.
This is particularly true in the case of IBR, due to a combination of increased post bachelor
degree attendance, longer time horizon for debt repayment, and higher overall repayments
for borrowers with higher balances.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 summarizes the literature, Section 1.3
describes the data and presents the empirical results, Section 1.4 provides an overview of
the model and the life cycle choices of individuals, Section 1.5 calibrates and estimates
the model to observed data patterns, Section 1.6 presents the main results of the model,
Section 1.7 analyzes policy counterfactuals, and, Section 1.8 concludes with some policy
discussion and future work.

5

1.2. Related Literature
The empirical evidence on how student debt affects earnings mostly points to a positive
relationship, at least in the short run4 . Based on a natural experiment in an elite university,
Rothstein and Rouse (2011) show that student debt causes college graduates to choose
jobs with an initial higher salary and reduces the probability that they choose ”public” low
paid jobs. Luo and Mongey (2019) find that a version of these results generalizes to the
cross section of the U.S. colleges. In particular, they find that higher student debt causes
college graduates to take jobs with higher wages, lower job satisfaction, and more on the
job search.
Using a difference-in-difference approach, Gerald and Smythe (2019) study the impact of
student debt on various labor market outcomes (income, hourly wages, and hours worked).
They conclude that indebted students have initial higher earnings due to higher work hours
rather than higher wage rates. Chapman (2015) finds that exogenously increasing the
loan burden of a college graduate by $1,000 increases their income by $400-$800 one year
after graduation. Field (2009) shows that law students who were offered loans were more
likely to accept jobs in higher paying corporate law rather than public interest law.
Nonetheless, higher initial earnings may not necessarily lead to higher lifetime earnings if
they are not followed by further human capital investment (Becker (1962), Ben-Porath
(1967), Hause (1972) and Mincer (1974)). In this line of thought, Fos, Liberman
and Yannelis (2017) investigate the effects of student debt on additional human capital
investment measured as graduate school enrollment. They find that a $4,000 increase in
student debt reduces the likelihood of enrollment in graduate school by 1.5 percentage
points. We contribute to this empirical literature by analyzing the impact of student debt
on both earnings and educational outcomes one, four and ten years after graduation for a
nationally representative sample of college graduates.
4

For empirical studies that conclude a negative or neutral effect of student debt on earnings see: Weidner
(2016), Akers (2012) , Zhang (2013).

6

Another set of empirical articles have analyzed the role of student loans on first time home
ownership. Controlling for multiple factors, Houle and Berger (2015), Cooper and
Wang (2014) and Gicheva and Thompson (2014) show that student debt reduces the
likelihood of homeownership for young households5 . Using variations in tuition for public
four-year colleges, Bleemer et al. (2020) find that the recent increase in student debt
could explain between 11 and 35 percent of the decline in young’s homeownership over
2007-2015.
Using a similar approach, Mezza et al. (2020) estimate that a $1,000 increase in student
debt decreased first time homeownership by approximately 1.5 p.p. for public 4-year college
graduates who left school between 1997 and 2005. Differently from this literature, we focus
on the impact of student debt on first-time home-ownership for bachelor’s degree recipients6 ,
and show that, consistent with a delay in graduate school enrollment, the initial average
impact of student debt on homeownership is positive (while the effect is negative within
educational groups).
Our analysis also relates to the literature that study student loan program design within
a quantitative framework. For example, Ionescu (2009) finds that repayment flexibility
increases college enrollment significantly, whereas relaxation of eligibility requirements has
little effect on enrollment or default rates. In a similar framework, Ionescu and Simpson
(2016) find that tuition subsides increase aggregate welfare by increasing college investment and reducing default rates in the private market. Johnson (2013) also shows that
tuition subsidies provide larger increases in college enrollments than increasing borrowing
limits. Compared to this literature, our model provides a more detailed characterization
of college graduates career and educational choices and post schooling consumption and
housing decisions.
5

Household formation and homeownereship choices are strongly linked. For example, Sieg and Wang
(2018) show that student debt has negative effects on marriage prospects of young female lawyers.
6
In Mezza et al. (2020), only 11% of the sample holds a bachelor’s degree, while 50% have no college
degree.

7

In a related paper, Di Maggio, Kalda and Yao (2019) examine the effect of student
debt forgiveness on individual credit and labor market outcomes. Using hand collected
lawsuits filings matched with individual credit bureau information, they find that borrowers
experiencing the debt relief shock reduce their overall indebtedness by 26%. They also find
that borrowers’ probability to change jobs increase after the discharge and this leads to an
increase in earnings by more than $4000 over a three year period. We examine the effects
of an hypothetical student debt forgiveness plan on graduate school enrollment, lifetime
earnings and home-ownership choices.
Finally, our paper relates to the quantitative literature that analyzes how initial conditions
affect lifetime earnings inequality. In particular, this literature focuses on the importance
of initial conditions relative to shocks over the life cycle. Huggett, Ventura and Yaron
(2011) study how heterogeneity in initial wealth and human capital affect lifetime inequality
by modelling earnings growth through a Ben-Porath production function. They find that
initial conditions, as measured at age 23, determine more than 60 percent of variation in
lifetime utility, and that the majority of this variation is determined by initial human capital
differences.
The role of initial conditions in shaping long term human capital accumulation has been
addressed in the search and matching literature as well. Using a model with directed search
and heterogeneous asset holdings, Griffy (2019) finds that initial wealth plays a crucial
role in determining life cycle inequality, and heterogeneity in skills has a relatively smaller
impact. This difference is caused by the inclusion of frictional labor markets, which makes
wealth have a first order effect on earnings. In a similar vein, Eeckhout and Sepahsalari
(2019) show that there is positive sorting between workers with net asset holdings and more
productive firms. Differently from this strand of literature, we model the labor market
as career paths with different (debt-funded and risky) human capital requirements and
include housing as a mechanism through which career choices interact with post-college
credit constraints.

8

1.3. Data and Empirical Analysis
1.3.1. Description of Data
Our main source of data comes from the restricted use dataset from the National Center for
Education Statistics (NCES) Baccalaureate and Beyond Survey (B&B). The survey follows
several cohorts of bachelor’s degree recipients over time and contains a mix of administrative and self reported data about their income, student debt, occupation, graduate school
enrollment and homeownership (among other variables).
B&B draws its cohorts from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS), which
collects data from large, nationally representative samples of postsecondary students and
institutions to examine how students pay for postsecondary education. B&B samples are
representative of graduating seniors in all majors and colleges. Our analysis focuses on the
most recently available cohort (2007/08), which was followed up one and four years after
graduation and was interviewed again in 2018 (forthcoming). We also use as robustness
students that graduated from college in 2016 and were followed one and four years after
graduation (forthcoming).
We restrict the sample to traditional college students: students who attended only one
college, enrolled between 2002 and 2004, and graduated at age 21-24. In terms of colleges,
we focus on four year public and private non-profit colleges, excluding private for-profit and
special focus institutions. After imposing these restrictions, we also remove all colleges for
which we do not have more than 3 students - this is necessary since we use an instrument
that is based on college level variation and we need enough students per college for the
sample to be representative.
Table 1.1 provides the main statistics for the whole sample and for the restricted sample.
The table also provides CPS statistics for individuals with at least a BA degree and aged 2225 in 2009 and 25-28 in 2012. Measures of earnings for Baccalaureate & Beyond for college

9

graduates are similar to the ones in Census: the average earning for a college graduate
in the restricted sample was $30,282 1 year after college, while $41,380 four years after
graduation. Around 40 percent of college graduates owned a house and 22 percent had a
Graduate Degree by 2012.
In order to understand the role of career sorting and its relationship with earnings and entry
into home ownership, we characterize career paths based on workers’ educational attainment
using the Current Population Survey (CPS). As expected, college graduates with a graduate
degree typically have higher earnings growth (Figure 1.2a). However, initial earnings are
similar to those with a Bachelor’s degree (with a high percentage of post-BA graduates
taking on graduate student debt). Indeed, educational choices are inextricably linked with
housing choices: Figure 1.2b shows that workers investing more in human capital have
significantly lower initial home ownership rates7 .
Figure 1.2: Earnings and Homeownership by Educational Attainment
(a) Median Earnings

(b) Homeownership

Source: Current Population Survey (CPS, 2005-2020) - males with at least a Bachelor’s Degree. Workers
with a graduate degree (in red) and with a bachelor’s degree (in blue). Lines represent smoothed trend.
7

Table A1.1 shows the average marginal effect of graduate school attainment on first-time homeownership (estimated with a probit model). Although higher mobility rates might be a contributing factor
to lower home-ownership for graduate degree recipients, the estimated marginal effects are lower for older
cohorts with lower amounts of student debt (Table A1.2).
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
B&B 08/09/12

IPEDS

CPS
Restricted

Full Panel

Restricted Panel

Full Sample

Public, non-doc.

16%

14%

18%

Public, doc.

43%

49%

44%

Private non-profit, non-doc

15%

13%

15%

Private non-profit, doc

17%

20%

18%

Other

10%

-

6%

66%

67%

65%

$ 25,048

$ 23,017

$ 24,900

61%

67%

$ 16,309

$ 18,214

SAT

1,081

1,091

Male

43%

45%

White

73%

80%

$ 34,554

$ 30,282

$ 30,362

$ 44,975

$ 41,380

$ 42,110

Home-ownership

38%

40%

43%

With a Graduate Degree

22%

22%

20%

College Obs.

1,440

750

Individual Obs.

14,250

7,030

Institutional Characteristics

Student Characteristics
Percentage Indebted
Total debt balance
Dependent
Expected Family Contribution

Outcomes
1 year after graduation
Current primary job salary
4 years after graduation
Current primary job salary

Source: Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study (B & B 2008/2012), CPS 2009-2012, and IPEDS.
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1.3.2. Empirical Specification

The relationship between debt and post college outcomes can be expressed in the following
reduced form Equation:

yi,c,t+τ = αc + βdi,c,t + Γwi,c,t + i,c,t+τ

(1.1)

where yi,c,t+τ is the individual’s outcome τ years after graduating from college c in year t,
αc is a vector capturing college characteristics, di,c,t is the log of the cumulative amount of
loans (federal and private) borrowed for undergraduate degree at time of graduation (t),
and wi,c,t is a vector of individual level observables.
With few students per college, college fixed effects (αc ) cannot be precisely estimated. We
therefore group colleges into different categories based on their sector (public or private nonprofit), selectivity (minimally, moderately, very selective), and their Carnegie Classification
(Doctorate granting Universities, Master’s or Baccalaureate Colleges). This groups together
similar colleges, controlling for college quality. We cluster standard errors at the college
group level.
In addition, we also include a rich set of individual controls (Γ). We use individuals characteristics that are included in the FAFSA financial aid application form (expected family
contribution and dependency status), the year they started college (i.e. whether students
spent 4, 5 or 6 years in college), gender and ethnicity. We also include the student college
entrance test score (SAT) and the major of study in order to account for student ability8 .
Finally, we add the ratio of the value of total institutional grants issued by the college to
the sum of grants and student loans in the year the student enrolled in college (xc,t0 (i) ) to
control for financial aid availability (see Section 1.3.3).
8

See Appendix A1.1 for more details about how these variables are defined.
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Nonetheless, unobserved students characteristics could still be relevant in determining access
to different forms of aid and have a direct impact on students’ post baccalaureate decisions;
this makes di,c,t a potential endogenous variable, and thus, the OLS estimator of Equation
1.1 could be biased. The bias could go in either direction. On the one hand, if low ability
students are less likely to receive grants or come from a low-income background, β will
reflect the latent negative correlation between ability and student borrowing. On the other
hand, students with higher earnings expectations could be more willing to borrow, resulting
in debt being positively selected.
1.3.3. Instrumental Variable: Institutional Grants
In this section, we show that supply side variations in the financial aid options faced by
all students in a particular college offer a way to overcome the identification problem. In
practice, students usually receive a year-by-year financial aid package that is determined
by college financial aid officers, but is not known in advance at the time of application. It
includes student loans, scholarships, and, grants from the government and the institution
itself.
Differently from government grants and student loans, institutional grants are funded from
net revenues and assets of the institution. Since institutional grants do not require repayment, they are preferred to loans and are the first to be added into a financial aid package.
Loans are therefore the marginal source of funds to most students. In order to capture this
substitution between institutional grants and loans, we follow Luo and Mongey (2019)
and compute the ratio of the value of total institutional grants issued by the college to the
sum of grants and student loans (grant to aid henceforth):

xc,t = (

inst.grantc,t
) · 100
inst.grantc,t + loanc,t
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Figure 1.3: Institutional Grants and Student Loans
(a) Public 4y Schools

(b) Private non-profit 4y Schools

Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS) (2007/08). Colleges are weighted by full-time first-time students enrollment. Average amount of institutional grants (in red) and student loans (in blue) by grant-to-aid for 4-year
public and private non-profit colleges and universities in the 2007/2008 academic year.

Figure 1.3 shows how variations in the grant to aid ratio capture the substitution between
the two measures of funding for both public and private non-profit colleges.
Nevertheless, the exclusion restriction may be violated if the grant to aid ratio is correlated
with unobserved students characteristics and those characteristics have a direct impact on
students’ post baccalaureate decisions. This may happen because students are not randomly
assigned to a college and they choose college based on a bundle of college characteristics,
which include financial aid availability.
In order to reduce this source of bias, we exploit variation in grant to aid policies during
college enrollment. These changes (Figure 1.4) are likely unexpected for the student at the
enrollment stage as they come from changes in the net revenues and assets of the university.
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Figure 1.4: Change in Grant to Aid

Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS 2007/08). Colleges are weighted by total full-time first-time students.

We thus take as our instrument (zc,t ) the average variation in grant to aid during college
enrollment (where t0 (i) represents the year when the individual first enrolled in college c):

zc,t = x̂c,t
= x̄c,t − xc,t0 (i)
Pt=T
t=t0 (i)+1 xc,t
=
− xc,t0 (i)
T − t0 (i) − 1
The amount of college debt (first stage regression) is modeled as an outcome of individual
demand for debt and these supply side college variations in institutional grants, represented
by:

di,c,t = µc + δzc,t + Πwi,c,t + ui,c,t
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(1.2)

We estimate the model by two-stage least squares regression (for earnings) and two-stage
probit model (for graduate school attainment and homeownership). Therefore, it is important that there is significant variation of the instrument with student debt across institutions.
Table 1.2 shows that such condition is satisfied. The results imply that, on average, a 10
percentage points increase in grant to aid during college enrollment induces a corresponding
30% decrease in cumulative student debt at graduation, all else equal.

Table 1.2: First Stage Regression

log(debt2008 )
(1)

-0.031∗∗∗

∆ Grant to Aid

[0.001]
Grant to Aid (at enrollment)

-0.046∗∗∗
[0.001]

Student Controls

Y

College Group FE

Y

Observations

7,030

Standard errors, clustered by college groups, in brackets.
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS 2007/08) and Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study (B & B
2008/2012). Colleges are weighted by total full-time first-time students.
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1.3.4. Empirical Results
This section presents our main empirical results. We show the causal effect of student
loans on earnings one, four and ten (forthcoming) years after college graduation. At the
same time, we analyze the role of debt on other post baccalaureate choices intrinsically
linked to earnings such as graduate school attendance and housing. We use the estimation
strategy proposed in the previous section, that is, using variation in student debt coming
from colleges that changed grant to aid policies while our sample of students were enrolled.
Results from the estimation of Equation (1.1) on earnings are given in the first two columns
of Table 1.3. The first column shows the OLS and IV estimates for earnings one year after
bachelor’s degree completion. Column (1) implies that, on average, increasing a student’s
debt by 30% (roughly a $ 7,000 increase) would lead to an increase in annual earnings of
9%. Column (2) runs the same equation on earnings growth 4 years after graduation and
shows that the effect turns significantly negative: increasing a student’s debt by 30% would
lead to a reduction in earnings growth of 3%.
The front loading effect of borrowing on earnings is thus consistent with the hypothesis
that highly indebted graduates need to boost their initial earnings to ease the burden of
repaying their loans. The negative growth on earnings might point to indebted workers
under-investing in additional education after college.
Columns (3) and (4) show the relationships between student debt and post baccalaureate
education. Column (3) shows the average marginal effects of debt on post BA attainment
4 years after graduation. Ceteris paribus, a 30% increase in college debt reduces the probability of having a post baccalaureate degree four years after graduation by 1.5 percentage
points. In addition, Column (4) shows the average marginal effect of debt on cumulative
post BA enrollment since college graduation. As we can see, more indebted students do not
catch up on graduate enrollment even four years after graduation.
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Column (5) shows the average marginal effect of debt on first-time homeownership: a 30%
increase in college debt increases the probability of being home owner by 1.5 p.p. (Column
(5)). Such a positive relationship with housing is consistent with indebted students working
more initially after graduating and under-investing in (risky debt-funded) additional human
capital.

Table 1.3: Student Debt and Post-baccalaureate Choices

Earnings

Education (t+4)

Housing (t+4)

log(wage)

Growth

Graduate

Graduate

t+1

t+4

Completion

Enrollment

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.012

-0.010

-0.001

-0.002

0.001

[0.013]

[0.030]

[0.001]

[0.002]

[0.001]

0.298∗∗∗

-0.102∗∗∗

-0.054∗∗∗

-0.045∗∗∗

0.052∗∗∗

[0.126]

[0.029]

[0.015]

[0.008]

[0.025]

Student Controls

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

College Group FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

7,030

7,030

7,030

7,030

7,030

OLS / Probit

IV

Observations

Ownership

Standard errors, clustered by college groups, in brackets.
Sources: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System, and Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study (B & B 2008/2012).

18

1.4. The Model
Our empirical estimates show that more indebted graduates front load earnings and give up
graduate school, but tend to access home ownership relatively earlier. How is this possible?
The crucial factor, as we will show, is that imperfect credit markets create a trade-off
between career and housing that, at certain values of parameters and debt, is consistent
with our empirical findings.
1.4.1. A simple 2-period model
We assume a deterministic two period model in which workers can only choose in a binary
fashion between two careers (i.e. graduate school or not, j ∈ {B, G}), and between buying
a house or not (H ∈ {0, 1}) without any access to the credit market9 . Homeowners (H=1)
receive a utility premium (vH ), but they have to pay for the housing price in the first period
(ph ). If workers choose to go to graduate school (j = G) they find themselves in a steeper
earnings profile: they receive lower earnings in the first period (w− ) but higher earnings in
the second period (w+ ). For simplicity, we assume no monetary cost for graduate school and,
thus, no additional student loans. Workers with student debt (d) maximize the following
inter-temporal utility problem:

V (d) = max log(c1 ) + log(c2 ) + log(vH )H
j,H

c1 = w1 (j) − pH − d,
c2 = w2 (j),

w1 (B) = w,

w2 (B) = w,

w1 (G) = w− < w

w2 (G) = w+ > w

This formulation yields simple analytic expressions for indirect utility and parameter ranges
for each career and housing choice.
9

We are indebted to Alistair Macaulay for suggesting us a way to discuss our results under this simple
two-period model.
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Let’s first consider the decision of a worker to choose to go to graduate school (j = G)
conditional on his housing decision (we normalize w to 1). The worker follows a threshold
rule:

d < d∗j =



+ −1

 w− w
− p, if H = 1
w+ −1




w− w+ −1
,
w+ −1

if H = 0

This implies that given the housing choice (H), workers are less likely to choose the steep
career path as student debt rises. At the same time, homeowners are less likely to go
to graduate school (d∗j (H = 1) < d∗j (H = 0)). This happens as the decision to go to
graduate school while being homeowner pushes further down consumption in the first period,
increasing U’(c1 ). Hence, going to graduate school is more expensive in utility terms. On
the other side, conditional on career choice, a recent college graduate chooses to buy a house
(H = 1) if:

d<

d∗H

=




w− −


 1−

pvH
vH −1 ,

pvH
vH −1 ,

if j = G
if j = B

In a similar vein, this implies that given the career choice (j), workers are less likely to
buy a house as student debt rises and buying a house is more expensive in utility terms for
those who attended graduate school. But, as these choices are taken jointly, there will be
four distinct regions for the first period discrete action: {H = 1, j = G}, {H = 0, j = G},
{H = 1, j = B}, and {H = 0, j = B}. We will denote the threshold value for each as d∗j,H .
In particular, our empirical findings are consistent with the following:

Proposition 4.1: Assume the first period costs of graduate school (j = G) are larger than
the cost of buying a house, i.e. w − w− > p. Then, for middling values of student debt,
workers will choose housing over graduate school (d∗G,0 < d∗B,1 ).
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To prove the result, it is sufficient to use the four thresholds introduced above. As we can see
in Figure 1.5a, for very low values of student debt, workers choose both to go to graduate
school and buy a house, while for very high levels of debt workers choose to stay as renters
and the flat career profile. However, there is a region of intermediate debt values for which
increasing balances induces workers to give up graduate school and buy a home. Hence,
U 0 (c1 ) rises faster for lower c1 . However, as Figure 1.5b shows, flattening the graduate
school earnings profile yields the opposite outcome: for intermediate debt values, increasing
student loan balances induces workers to give up home ownership.
The existence of this result strongly depends on the assumption of imperfect financial markets. In the next section, we analyze this career - housing trade-off using a life cycle model
with more dimensions of heterogeneity. In addition, we add (1) idiosyncratic human capital
and unemployment risk, (2) monetary cost (and amenity value) to attend graduate school
and switch to steeper earnings profile (which implies more student debt), and, (3) imperfect
mortgage market.
Figure 1.5: Indirect Utility
(b) Alternative (higher w− , lower w+ )

(a) Baseline

Indirect utility functions as a function of undergraduate student debt. Baseline assumes w− < vH < w+ .
Colors represent different discrete choices: in black {H = 1, j = G}, in red {H = 0, j = G}, in blue
{H = 1, j = B}, in green {H = 0, j = B}.
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1.4.2. The life-cycle Model
The model described in this section builds on important contributions to the human capital
literature, as the career choice model of Keane and Wolpin (1997) and the Ben-Porath
(1967) model presented in Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2011), extended to include
student debt and durable consumption (Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2011)).
The aim is to build a richer model that not only replicates the intuition of the previous
section, but can also be used to perform policy counterfactual analysis.
A unit measure of college graduates enter the labor market in each period and are heterogeneous in ability (a), human capital (h), liquid wealth (k) and student debt (d). Each
household lives for T periods deterministically. During working age, workers can decide
to enroll in graduate school: if they do, they access a different career path. Workers also
sequentially decide labor and human capital investment within their career, savings and
housing and non housing consumption while they pay for student debt (if any).
1.4.3. Setting
Preferences. Each agent maximizes expected lifetime utility over non durable consumption
(c) and durable consumption (s) (see Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) and
Kaplan, Mitman and Violante (2019)):

u(c, s) =

(cζ1 s1−ζ1 )1−σ
1−σ

(1.1)

where c>0 and s=1+ζ2 , and ζ2 is the housing service from owned housing.
Labor Income. When individuals work, hourly earnings are priced competitively to reflect
their marginal productivity. Assuming a representative firm that uses human capital from
workers in both careers, earnings are given by the human capital augmented number of
hours worked, multiplied by the equilibrium rental rate (Rt ):
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ν

wj,t (lt , ht ) = Rt lt ht j

(1.2)

Workers are also exposed to unemployment risk: they can be separated from their job with
probability ρ; while unemployed, they earn home production b, but cannot invest in human
capital. When workers retire, they are assigned pension transfers that are proportional to
their last earnings.
Careers and human capital. We restrict career choice to two different paths. In each
career path, their compensation is equal to the marginal product of hours. Formally, norν

malizing rental rate Rt = 1, we get hourly wage wj,t = ht j , with j = {B, G}. The two
paths differ in how workers’ human capital accumulation translates into productive human capital. Human capital is less productive (νB < νG ) for workers without graduate
school education. Therefore, assuming workers make identical human capital investments,
differences in earnings would grow as workers accumulate human capital.
After the career choice is made, individuals sequentially choose how much hours to work
(lt ) and invest in further human capital (1 − lt ). Human capital evolves according to the
following Ben-Porath law of motion:

ht+1 = ezt+1 (ht + a((1 − lt )ht )α ),

zt+1 ∼ N (µz , σz2 )

(1.3)

which depends on individual’s ability (a) and with risk coming from human capital idiosyncratic shocks. The Ben-Porath formulation implies that switching to the ”steeper” career
path that follows graduate school has three contrasting effects on human capital investment
decisions. Firstly, since earnings in the steeper career path loads more on human capital,
investments are riskier. Secondly, higher marginal product of human capital gives weaker
incentives for graduate school educated worker to invest in human capital because of a simple wealth effect. Thirdly, νG > νB generates a strong substitution effect, in that every unit
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of consumption today that is foregone in order to invest in human capital generates higher
returns in the future. The third effect seems to be dominant in the data, suggesting that
difference in career paths are amplified by endogenous human capital investment.
Graduate School. Individuals can enroll in graduate school until age 32: if they do, they
attend for S periods, and then start to work in their new career. While enrolled, human
capital grows in every period at rate γ, and workers pay tuition (pg ) and consume using a
combination of their liquid savings (k) and graduate student loans (dg ). They also get non
monetary utility ξ, which is the amenity value of being in school as opposed to working.
Financial Markets. Agents can save in liquid assets k. Workers are allowed to borrow
short term, using the rate r− , but they face a credit card borrowing constraint that depends
on their current income (φ). If k > 0, savings yield a constant risk free rate r+ .
Student Loans. There are several options for repaying student loans, but the traditional
and still most common is the 10-year fixed payment plan. Similar to a mortgage, the
borrower makes constant payments over 120 months until the balance of principal and
interest is paid off. Student loan payments (Pd ) can be obtained as:

Pd =

d0
(1+rd )τ −1
rd (1+rd )τ

(1.4)

where d0 is the student debt at the time of college graduation and rd is the gross interest
rate on student loans. If a worker enrolls in graduate school, payments are suspended while
enrolled and graduate school debt is added to the students’ balance. After graduation,
undergraduate and graduate student debt is consolidated and a new standard repayment
plan is started, giving the worker 120 months to repay the full amount.
Housing. Workers can buy a house at any moment of their life - except when they are
enrolled in graduate school - as long as their life span is long enough that they can cover the
30-year mortgage and they have enough liquid assets to use as a downpayment. Workers
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are also subject to housing preference shocks, which capture shifts in life events (household
formation or divorce). We model those shifts as taste shocks, i.e. additively separable choice
specific random taste shocks, and assume they are i.i.d. Extreme Value type I distributed
with scale parameter σε . If a worker chooses not to own their house, she has to rent (Pr ).
The rental price is tied to the price of the house, Po , and is set to match a given price to
rent ratio. Individuals can ask for a 30-year fixed mortgage (m) to pay the price of the
house (Po ).
There is no possibility of default or asking for a second mortgage. Home ownership is
treated as an absorbing state, so if an individual is homeowner in a given year, then it will
stay as homeowner at all future dates. At the time of buying the house, individuals face
two borrowing constraints: (1) they must make a downpayment (1-λ), (2) their monthly
debt payments (student and mortgage debt) cannot exceed a proportion of their income
(ψ). We assume that both constraints must be enforced at origination only.
Home owners must always pay the mortgage payment (Pm ) until mortgage balances are
zero, following:

Pm =

(1 − λ)ph
(1+rd )30 −1
rd (1+rd )30

(1.5)

1.4.4. Recursive formulation
We will illustrate the problem for agents of different stages of life, as the recursive formulation will differ according to it. The unit of time is a semester. The choice is motivated
by several facts: it corresponds to the length of the initial grace period (when student loan
payments must not be made), it allows for a reasonable accounting of separation risk, and
yet it reduces the time dimension enough so that we can solve and estimate the model.
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We write future values in recursive expressions by adding a 0 to them. The choice-specific
value functions are denoted indicating the discrete state - for instance, VoB indicates the
value function of a home-owner without a post-bachelor degree education.

Retired workers:

At retirement age t = tR , workers are assigned pension transfers (p) that are proportional
to their last earnings (w = wtR −1 ). Retired workers make consumption and saving decisions
using their savings from working age (ktR −1 ). If they are home owners (o), they have to
pay the residual parts of their mortgage (m) in equal payments (Pm ) until mortgage debt is
fully paid off. Otherwise, if they are renters (r), they need to rent and pay Pr every period.
Retired workers cannot buy a house, as mortgage duration exceeds their life expectancy.
We assume no bequests and terminal condition for liquid assets to be equal to zero. Finally,
we impose a non-negativity constraint on consumption on all agents.

Recursive Problem for renters, for t = tR , ..., T , is :

Vr,t (a, w, k) = max
u(c, s) + βVr,t+1 (a, w, k 0 )
0
k

(1.6)

c + k 0 + Pr = (1 + r) · k + pw
mT = 0, kT = 0, k 0 ≥ φ(pw), c ≥ 0,

The Problem for home owners for t = tR , ..., T , with mortgage payment Pm is:

u(c, s) + βVo,t+1 (a, w, k 0 , m0 )
Vo,t (a, w, k, m) = max
0
k

c + k 0 + Pm = (1 + r) · k + pw
m0 = (1 + rd )m − Pm ≥ 0
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(1.7)

kT = 0, k 0 ≥ φ(pw), c ≥ 0

In both cases, r = r+ if k ≥ 0, and r = r− otherwise.

Workers:

Agents enter working age (t = 1, ..., tR−1 ), and face two discrete choices every period: which
career to pursue, i.e. whether to enroll in graduate school (j = {B, G}), and whether to
buy a house or not (H = {r, o}). In both cases, workers are subject to preference shocks respectively, denote the preference shock for the housing choice as σε εH , and the preference
shock for the schooling choice as σε εj . Both preference shocks are i.i.d. Extreme Value type
I distributed with scale parameter σε (McFadden (1973) and Iskhakov et al. (2017)).
Workers’ problem entails saving and choosing how much hours to work (l) and invest in
further human capital (1 − l) in every period. Human capital investment is risky and
subject to an independent and identically distributed idiosyncratic shock every period (z).
Earnings are given by the human capital augmented number of hours worked multiplied by
the equilibrium rental rate as defined in (1.2).
There is also unemployment risk: while working (u = 0), they can be exogenously separated
from their job with probability ρ; while unemployed (u = 1), they earn home production b,
but cannot invest in human capital, so that h0 = h. In order to apply for a mortgage and
thus become a homeowner, workers have to satisfy the down-payment constraint (governed
by the ratio λ) and at the same time satisfy the debt to income constraint (determined by
the value ψ). Once the mortgage is approved, the payments (Pm ) are fixed for the next 30
years as defined in (1.5).
Workers that enter the labor market with any positive amount of student debt (d0 > 0)
are by default enrolled in a 10-year fixed rate repayment plan and don’t have the option of
defaulting or deferring on student loan payments.

27

For notational convenience, we can collect shocks and exogenous states in e = {z, u, }, and
all the other idiosyncratic states in x = {a, h, k, d, m}, where d indicates residual student
debt balances. The recursive problem for renters without graduate school education, while
employed10 , is thus:

n
o
B
B
0 0
Vr,t
(x, e) = max
u(c,
s)
+
σ
+
βE[
Ṽ
(x
,
e
)]
B,r
t+1
0
k ,l

(1.8)

c + k 0 + (Pr + Pd ) = (1 + r) · k + wB (l, h)
0

h0 = ez (h + a((1 − l)h)α )
d0 = (1 + rd )d − Pd ≥ 0
k 0 ≥ φ, c ≥ 0

where:


 B

B
G
B
E[Ṽt+1
(x0 , e0 )] = E max Vr,t+1
+ σ0B,r , Vr,t+1
+ σ0G,r , Vo,t+1
+ σ0B,o

and VRG and VoB are the value function of a worker enrolled in grad school and homeowner,
respectively. Unemployed workers’ problem is analogous, with earnings replaced by b and
no human capital investment decision. Unemployed workers can find a job in the same
career with probability 1 − ρ.
Home owners with housing payment Pm face the following problem:

n
o
B
B
0 0
Vo,t
(x, e) = max
u(c,
s)
+
σ
+
βE[
Ṽ
(x
,
e
)]
B,o
t+1
0
k ,l

c + k 0 + (Pm + Pd ) = (1 + r) · k + wB (l, h)
10

See Appendix A1.2 for details about how we compute this problem.
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(1.9)

0

h0 = ez (h + a((1 − l)h)α )
d0 = (1 + rd )d − Pd ≥ 0
m0 = (1 + rd ) m − Pm

Pm =




λph ,




if m = 30 · Pm

rd (1+rd )30 (1−λ)ph
(1+rd )30 −1

k 0 ≥ φ, c ≥ 0,

if m < 30 · Pm

Pm + Pd
≤ψ
wB

where:

 B
B
E[Ṽt+1
(x0 , e0 )] = E max Vo,t+1
+

G
σ0B,o , Vo,t+1
+

σ0G,o ,



If the worker is in the first period of home ownership, Pm equals to the downpayment
required to buy the house. After that period, housing payments are determined by the
mortgage equation (1.5), as before.
At this point we want to characterize the recursive problem of the individual attending
graduate school. For simplicity, we will characterize only the problem of the renter. Define
S̄ as the number of periods required to get the degree. For s ≤ S̄:

n
o
G
G
0 0 0
Vr,t
(x, e, s) = max
u(c,
s)
+
ξ
+
σ
+
βE[
Ṽ
(x
,
e
,
s
)]
G,r
t+1
0
k

c + k 0 + Pr + pg = (1 + r) · k + dg
h0 = (1 + g) · h
d0 = (1 + rd ) · d + dg · 1s=1
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(1.10)

k 0 ≥ 0, c ≥ 0

We assume that, during graduate school, the borrowing constraint with liquid assets is
tighter - since the individual is not working she has to keep her liquid assets positive. When
s > S̄, the recursive problem is analogous to the problem of a worker with student loans,
conditional on career earnings’ slope νG .

1.5. Calibration and Estimation
In this section, we discuss how we determine the parameters required for the analysis.
We set these parameters in two ways. First, we set some parameters from elsewhere in
the literature or by using data estimation (Table 1.4). The remaining parameters are
estimated using indirect inference through the model.
1.5.1. External Parameters
Timing. Each period time in the model represents two quarters. Individuals start making
decisions when they graduate from college. After finishing college, they start working and
repaying their student debt. Agents retire at the age of 65 and die when they are 80.
Preferences. Preferences are set using standard calibration in the macroeconomics literature. The yearly discount factor is set to be 0.99. We set the constant relative risk aversion
in the utility function to 2.
Career and Human Capital. Following Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2011), we
set the mean shock of human capital to -0.029, with 0.111 variance and the production
function parameter α to 0.66. We assume that, when unemployed, worker gains access to
unemployment benefits that sum up to b calibrated to the Federal poverty threshold for an
individual living alone in 2008 ($991 USD a month).
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Table 1.4: External Parameters
Parameter

Value

Description

Source

T

126

Model periods (semesters)

-

R

88

Working Periods

-

β

0.99

Discount Factor

-

σ

2

Coeff. of Risk Aversion

-

α

0.66

Ben-Porath Production Function

Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2011)

µz

-0.029

Mean Shock of Human Capital

Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2011)

σz

0.111

Riskiness of Human Capital Investment

Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2011)

pg

$ 50,000

Cost of Graduate School (one period)

IPEDS

S

4

Graduate School periods

NCES

Timing and Preferences

Careers, Human Capital

Labor Income
ρ

{6%, 4.5%}

Separation Probability

Menzio, Telyukova and Visschers (2016)

b

$991

Home Production (monthly)

Federal poverty threshold (2008)

Financial Markets
φ

−$ 5,000

Credit Card Borrowing Limit

Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)

r+

2%

Interest on liquid assets

Federal Reserve Board of Governors (2014)

r−

11%

Borrowing Rate

Federal Reserve Board of Governors (2014)

rd

6%

Interest on student loans and mortgages

Department of Education and PMMS

Greenwald (2018)

Housing
λ

0.15

Downpayment (fraction of house price)

ψ

0.43

Debt-to-Income Ratio

Dodd-Frank limit

ph

$ 250,000

House price

Case-Shiller house price index (2008-2012)

ν

0.02

price-to-rent

Case-Shiller house price index (2008-2012)

Labor Income. We set the rental rate to a yearly rate of 5% of the house price, and
pension to be 45 percent of the last earned income. Finally, exogenous separation risk is
set to 6 percent per year for bachelor-educated workers, and 4.5 percent for workers with
a post-Bachelor degree, matching the average number of employment to unemployment
transition of the two groups (see Menzio, Telyukova and Visschers (2016)).
Financial Markets and student debt. The annual interest rate for student loans and a
30-year fixed rate mortgage is calibrated to the 2004-2008 average rate of 6 percent (Figure
1.6). The risk free interest rate for savings is set at 0 following null real returns after 2008
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and credit card borrowing rate is fixed at an annual 10 percent. We set a credit card
borrowing limit of −$5, 000, targeting a median rate of credit limit to annual labor income
for college graduates of 20 percent.
Housing. We set the price of the house at the average home price in the U.S. ($250,000)
during the years 2008-2012. The rental price is set to match the price to rent ratio (0.02).
The parameters that determine the LTV and DTI are chosen to match institutional features
of the US mortgage market.
For the LTV parameter, we fix a downpayment constraint of 0.15·Po . This value is intended
to reflect the distribution of the LTV in Freddie Mac data, which has two masses point
around 80% and 90%, where the first mass point is typically populated by younger buyers
and thus seems more appropriate for pinning down the problem of first home ownership
(see Greenwald (2018))). In order to qualify for a Qualified Mortgage under CFPB
guidelines, a borrower’s total debt to income ratio, including the mortgage payment and all
other recurring debt payments, cannot exceed 43 percent.

Figure 1.6: Interest Rate on Student Loan and Mortgage Debt

Sources: Fannie Mae Single Family Dataset, Federal Student Aid, U.S. Department of Education, and,
Freddie Mac’s Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS).
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1.5.2. Distribution of Initial Characteristics
In order to simulate the model, we have to make parameter choices regarding starting values
of liquid assets, ability, human capital and student debt.
While college graduates typically do not have substantial wealth of their own, they may have
access to alternative sources of wealth that are not directly measured. We assume students
leave college with zero liquid assets, but receive an exogenous transfer from their parents.
We use the Expected Family Contribution (EFC)11 , with an average transfer of $16, 309
(µk ) and a standard deviation of $16, 321 (σk ). We also use B&B data for the student debt
distribution. We use an average debt balance of $16, 619. This figure is composed by a
percentage of 66% of borrowers, with cumulative average balances of $25, 048 (µd ) and a
standard deviation of $18, 223 (σd ). We also take the correlation between parental transfers
and student debt of -0.17 (ρk,d ).
Following Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2011), we assume that the distribution of
ability and human capital is jointly log normally distributed. We calibrate the initial mean
(µh ) and standard deviation (σh ) of human capital to match the mean and standard deviation of earnings one year after graduation from B&B data - respectively at $34, 554 and
$20, 600. We calibrate the mean level of ability (µa ) in order to match a yearly average
growth rate of earnings for college graduates of 3%. We take the correlation between human
capital and ability (σa,h ) from Athreya et al. (2019), who estimate a life cycle model of
education choice and report a correlation of 0.67.
Finally, we need to determine the correlation between ability and student debt (ρa,d ). This
parameter has an important interpretation because, if correctly identified, it informs about
the bias that an econometrician would be subject to when estimating Equation (1.1) with
least squares. We estimate this parameter, jointly with other structural parameters, to
match the key properties of the earnings and homeownership profiles on CPS and B&B.
11

The EFC is calculated according to a formula established by law. Student’s family’s taxed and untaxed
income, assets, and benefits (such as unemployment or Social Security) are considered in the formula.
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1.5.3. Estimation
Simulated Method of Moments

Parameters Θ = {ξ, γ, νg , ζ1 , ζ2 , ρa,d } are jointly estimated by Simulated Method of Moments
(see Gourieroux, Monfort and Renault (1993) , Smith Jr (1993) and Gallant and
Tauchen (1996) ). Let Let xi be an i.i.d. data vector, i = 1, ..., n, and yis (Θ) be an i.i.d.
simulated vector from simulation s, so that i = 1, ..., N , and s = 1, ..., S. The goal is
to estimate Θ by matching a set of simulated moments, denoted as h(yi,s (Θ)), with the
corresponding set of actual data moments, denoted as h(xi ).
Define:

#
" n
1 X
1
gn (Θ) =
h(xi ) − h(yi,s (Θ))
n
S

(1.11)

i=1

Building gn (Θ) in this case faces an important challenge. In classic SMM estimation,
exploration of the state space requires the model to be solved more than 10000 times.
In the case of a model with a large state space like ours, this could be very computationally
expensive12 .
To overcome the curse of dimensionality, we discretize the parameter space using sparse
grids (see Bungartz and Griebel (2004)). A similar approach in structural modelling
has been using in the context of maximum likelihood estimation, see for instance Heiss
and Winschel (2008).
By using functions with support restricted to a neighborhood of each point to build h(yi,s (Θ)),
our approach is suitable for approximating the parameter-moment mapping even in cases
of sharp behavior, like large fluctuations of the gradient (see Stoyanov (2013)).
12

Using a cluster with 144 CPUs, we manage to obtain a full solution of the model and simulate it in
about 14 minutes.
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Having h(yi,s (Θ)) at hand, we can construct an objective function that looks like:

Θ̂ = arg min gn0 (Θ)Ŵn gn (Θ)
Θ

(1.12)

where Ŵn is a positive definite matrix that converges in probability to a deterministic
positive definite matrix W . There are many feasible choices for the covariance matrix, and
it is common to simply rely on an identity matrix for W . To construct the optimal weight
matrix, we use the influence function technique from Erickson and Whited (2002) (see
also Bazdresch, Kahn and Whited (2017) for an application closer to our case). The
derivation is explained in detail in Appendix A1.3. Finding a solution to (1.12) faces the
issue of the possible presence of many local minima: to make sure our solution is robust, we
restart our optimization routine using multiple sets of starting values. Each routine solves
its problem using a Nelder-Mead algorithm. Having an estimate of h(yi,s (Θ)) also allows us
to obtain standard errors of parameter estimates, as they can be calculated knowing that:



  
∂gn (Θ) ∂gn (Θ) −1
1
W
aVar Θ̂ = 1 +
S
∂Θ
∂Θ0

(1.13)

Identification and Parameter Estimates

The model generates a large number of moments that can be used for estimation. Since
interactions between each choice are quite complex, global identification is not possible
even if one can attempt a one to one mapping between model parameters and empirical
moments. Local identification, however, simply requires that the gradient of the model
implied moments with respect to the parameter, ∂h(yi,s (Θ))/∂Θ, has full rank. As noted
in Bazdresch, Kahn and Whited (2017), this condition suggests that for a parameter
to be identified, some subset of the vector of implied moments, must change when that
particular parameter moves (see Figure A1.4).
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Table 1.5 shows the empirical moments we target in our estimation. We use the ratio of
home ownership at age 40 by education groups (when the ratio is 1) and the constant and
slope of life cycle home-ownership as target moments. Housing preferences (ζ1 and ζ2 ) are
identified by shifts in these moments. The reason for this is that housing demand of workers
with a post-bachelor degree is more sensitive to changes in the flow value: as it grows, not
only less graduates enroll in post-bachelor programs, but workers with additional education
try to enter into home ownership earlier, thus matching the home ownership of workers that
only have a bachelor.
We also use as a moment the debt-to-income ratio at age 30. The most related parameter is
the amenity value of graduate school (ξ): this is the value that mostly relates to the degree
of sorting into additional education by ability, which in turn determines graduate school
enrollment and student loan balances. We can also identify ξ by looking at shifts in the
relative level of incomes by educational attainment. We use the ratio of the constant and
the slope of life cycle earnings calculated from individuals aged 24-40 in CPS.
Table 1.5: Target Moments
Moments

Mean
Data Model

A. Sample Means
Graduate to Bachelor Homeownership at age 40

1.0

0.77

Debt to Income at age 30

0.59

0.59

B. Regression Coefficients
Home ownership, constant

0.474 0.524

Home ownership, slope

0.019 0.018

Graduate to Bachelor earnings ratio, constant

1.10

1.04

Graduate to Bachelor earnings ratio, slope

1.71

1.75

Source: Current Population Survey (individuals with at least a bachelor degree) and model estimates.
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We want to know about the two earnings parameters (γ and νg ); γ ultimately determines the
value of attending a post-bachelor degree. In the model, it also affects sorting, enrollment,
and overall home ownership. However, only the relationship with the constant term in the
home ownership life cycle profile is monotonous; as γ grows, it first increases graduate school
attendance. Then, it also starts to allow more indebted workers to postpone enrollment,
and so the ratio decreases without affecting the ratio of the earnings profiles.
The most straightforward identifying relationship is a result of higher γ simply increasing
returns to graduate studies, thus allowing more workers to enter into home ownership at
some point in time. More intuitively, the skill premium νg identifies the ratio of debt to
income. The reason is that the skill premium, besides affecting earnings, is the main reason
for increasing or decreasing early enrollment in the model.
Finally, we find that the correlation between debt and ability, ρa,d is clearly identified by
the ratio in the slopes of life cycle profiles of earnings. This is also intuitive: as the relationship between debt balances and ability becomes stronger (i.e. more negative), sorting into
post bachelor degrees will unambiguously increase, other things not varying much. Hence,
our model implies that growth in earnings differentials are mostly coming from increased
borrowing of graduates with lower learning ability.
Table 1.6 displays parameter estimates. The amenity value of graduate school is expressed
in dollar terms, but does not correspond to ξ. To obtain it, we assume individuals in grad
school are renters and have zero net liquid assets. Then the value is obtained by solving for
the amount of consumption increase that would yield equivalent flow utility to grad school
attendance. Standard errors tells us that the estimates are precise - the only minor concern
being represented by the objective function being less sensitive to changes in ξ.
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Table 1.6: Estimated Parameters
Parameter

Description

Value

Standard Dev.

ξ

Amenity Value of Graduate School

$55.171

$16.795

γ

Graduate School Growth in Human Capital

8.36%

0.15%

νG

Graduate School Skill Premium

14.25%

3.9%

ζ1

Elasticity to Housing Service

0.539

0.0069

ζ2

Housing Service

$20.484

$695

ρa,d

Correlation (ability, debt)

−0.124

0.01

Source: Model estimates using Simulated Method of Moments.

Model Fit

The model replicates well overall earnings dynamics (Figure 1.7). The model matches
pretty well average yearly income growth (1.9% in the data and 1.9% in our model), and
earnings growth naturally slows because of income effects in the Ben-Porath function.
The patterns in enrollment replicates gradual entry into post graduate studies, and the level
slightly more than a third of college educated workers pursuing further education. Because
of the extreme assumption that human capital accumulated while working in one career is
destroyed when switching13 , workers in the model tend to enroll slightly earlier than in the
data.
The slope in the life cycle pattern of home ownership in our model is higher than in the
data: especially in early years, home ownership is substantially lower, and then it catches up
later in the working life. This can be explained with the choice of abstracting from bequest
shocks in the model, as they would allow households to bring forward home ownership by
relaxing their budget constraint.
13

This choice is appropriate for some post-bachelor degrees, in particular the professional ones, where
previous experience is hardly useful in the career implied by the degree. But it is clearly less appropriate
to capture the role some other degrees, as MBAs and executive MBAs, play in the career of workers with
some years of experience.
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Another factor that limits earlier home purchases is our assumption of having just one size
(and thus one price) available to workers. Extending the choice set by allowing individuals to
differentiate their purchases with respect to price is the next step for improving the fit of our
model to the data. Decomposing the rate of home ownership by graduate school attainment
and debt levels, we can see that the delay in purchases is almost entirely attributable to
workers that pursue graduate studies (see Figure 1.8).

Figure 1.7: Earnings and Enrollment Life Cycle Profiles (model and data)

Source: Model estimates (solid line) and data estimates (dashed line) computed using the Current Population
Survey (CPS 2010-2020), workers with at least a Bachelor’s Degree aged 23-50.
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Figure 1.8: Homeownership Life Cycle Profiles (by career and debt levels)

Home ownership

80%

data
grad, low debt
grad, high debt
bach, low debt
bach, high debt

60%

40%

20%

0%

20s

30s

40s

Source: Model estimates (bars) and data estimates (line) computed using the Current Population Survey
(CPS 2010-2020), workers with at least a Bachelor’s Degree aged 23-50.

1.6. Results
1.6.1. The Role of Student Debt
There are two main trade-offs involved in the initial career choice. First, workers that
not pursue additional education start with higher disposable income but then have lower
income growth compared to the more human capital intensive careers. Second, income
paths of bachelor educated workers are less volatile as human capital accumulation is a
risky investment. Workers whose undergraduate borrowing is above the average level start
with higher earnings, because they are most likely to be working rather than being enrolled.
After some years, the sorting effects of student loans start to affect earnings, and thus create
a wide and persistent earnings gap.
Table 1.7 shows the estimated impact of an increase in debt on earnings, education and
housing and compares it with the empirical estimates from Section 1.3.4.
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In the model, indebted graduates have 0.13% higher earnings for each 1% of additional
student borrowing, but 0.21% lower earnings growth in the following four years. The model
also replicates well the impact of debt on graduate school attendance and home ownership.
In absence of frictions to borrowing, student loans should have no effect on career choices and
human capital investment. In our model, the effects of student loans on career choices and
lifetime earnings are ultimately the result of two main frictions. First, young workers face
credit constraints that limit their ability to smooth durable and non-durable consumption.
Second, student loans follow a predetermined fixed repayment schedule and alternative
repayment schemes are limited14 .

Table 1.7: Student Debt, Earnings, Career and Housing
Moments

Mean
Data Model

Earnings
∂yt+1 /∂dt

0.298 0.131

∂∆yt,t+4 /∂dt

-0.102 -0.216

Graduate School
∂P (G)t+4 /∂dt

-0.054 -0.063

Homeownership
∂P (H)t+4 /∂dt

0.052 0.069

∆yt,t+4 is the 4-year growth in earnings after graduation
Source: Instrumental Variable regression results using Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study
(BB:2007/08) and model estimates .
14

Our empirical analysis is focused on graduates that entered the labor market in 2008: during those
years, less than 7% of borrowers enrolled in plans that allowed payments to be linked to earnings. After a
series of reforms, enrollment in income based plans has increased substantially in the following decade.
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Table 1.8 shows how entry into graduate school is affected by borrowing conditional on
ability levels. More indebted students are significantly less likely to enroll. This happens for
two reasons: on the one hand, while attending school allows to postpone payments, new debt
is added to the existing one. Adding the burden of additional borrowing has compounding
effects which put considerable pressure on future disposable consumption, thus discouraging
enrollment. On the other hand, workers still have the possibility of starting to repay, while
working, and then enrolling when their debt burden has reduced.
The value of switching, however, decreases with tenure due to a horizon effect: as the worker
gets older, and approaches the age where it would be optimal to start a mortgage, attending
graduate school would imply a postponement of entry into home ownership because of the
binding credit constraint, reducing the value of additional education. Interestingly, the
largest impact of borrowing on enrolment is on individuals with higher ability. A dampened
sorting into careers points on the second effect being dominant: in fact, while relatively low
ability individuals enroll smoothly over post graduation years, high ability individuals who
would postpone getting additional education and switching career find the option becoming
increasingly costly as they get older.

Table 1.8: Sorting into Post-Bachelor Degrees
Graduate School Enrollment

Student Debt

Total

< $22.560 > $22.560
Graduate School Enrollment at Age 26
Low Ability

2.8%

2.33%

2.64%

High Ability

46.01%

32.25%

41.51%

Low Ability

13.52%

11.20%

12.74%

High Ability

55.84%

43.80%

51.86%

Overall Graduate School Enrollment

Source: model estimates.

42

1.6.2. Lifetime Earnings
In order to understand the relative importance of different channels in affecting earnings
over the life cycle, we decompose earnings growth differential between workers. To do
so, we group workers based on different percentiles of student debt distribution. Notice
one can obtain average earnings growth from Equation (1.3). Define sG as the share of
post bachelor educated workers in a given group, ā as the average ability and F (h) as the
distribution of human capital in that group. Average earnings growth can be defined as:

Z
∆(w) =

ā ((1 − l)h)α dF (h)
(sG νG + (1 − sG )νB ) |{z}
|
|
{z
}
{z
}
ability

skill prem.

(1.14)

hum. capital

As argued above, highly indebted workers choose flatter earnings profiles. In Figure 1.9
we decompose the earnings growth differentials between the lowest and the highest tercile
of workers ordered by undergraduate borrowing. Interestingly, ability plays a minor role
in determining earnings growth differentials. This comes from two aspects. First, model
estimates deliver small correlation between initial ability and debt. More importantly,
though, there is ex post sorting that depends on the fact that human capital accumulation
is risky at the individual level.
Figure 1.9: Decomposing Earnings Growth: Low versus High Debt

2.5%

Skill Premium
Ability
Human Capital
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0.5%
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Source: model estimates.
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High ability - high debt individuals with good human capital realizations experience both
high initial wage growth and lower rate of enrollment in post bachelor degrees, as the
option value of switching career decreases substantially after their human capital (and thus
earnings) reach a higher level, hence they stay in the labor force while workers with lower
ability and the same realizations find enrollment more valuable and thus enroll (disappearing
temporarily from the workforce). As highly indebted students catch up on enrollment, the
contribution of skill premium decreases, but remains positive and eventually becomes the
main factor driving earnings growth differentials as human capital investment behavior
reaches a plateau for most workers.
Finally, we find that endogeonous human capital accumulation contributes for the lion share
of earnings growth differentials. Two effects go in the same direction in determining this
result. As one can see from the policy function of workers for the Ben-Porath human
capital investment choice, highly indebted workers simply choose to invest less in order to
have higher earnings in the current period. This is reinforced by career choices, as the same
investment has higher returns for workers that enjoy a higher skill premium, consistent with
earnings growth differentials being highest during the earlier years.
1.6.3. The Importance of Housing
In our model, student loans affect home ownership through two main channels. On the
one hand, highly indebted students are less likely likely to pursue extra education, which
has lower returns to human capital, thus lower expected growth but also lower income risk.
Thus, housing is a relatively more attractive investment at the start of the working career.
On the other hand, student loan borrowers might face more difficulties in satisfying both
the downpayment and the debt to income requirements for a mortgage. Since student loan
payments reduce workers’ disposable income, both investment in human capital and savings
will be smaller. In addition, higher borrowing sorts workers into less human capital intensive
careers, which negatively affects their lifetime earnings.
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Table 1.9: Entry into Home Ownership
Age of First Purchase

Non Borrowers

Borrowers
< $22.560

> $22.560

29
26

29
28

Group
All Workers
Only Bachelora

30
25

a= includes those who do not enroll in grad school at any point in time
Source: model estimates.

As shown in Table 1.9, all those effects play a decisive role in determining the age at
which households purchase their first home. From the second row it is possible to see that,
for those workers who don’t choose to enroll in graduate studies, borrowing affects home
ownership mostly through the wealth effect. Hence, borrowers enter into home ownership
later, with the delay growing nonlinearly in debt balances.
In the aggregate, however, the role of post-bachelor enrollment dominates. As we can
observe from the first row, the larger share of enrollment of non borrowers pushes home
ownership to later in life. As balances grow, the two effects compensate each other.
To understand how relevant the housing channel is in determining education and career
choices, we compare model predictions in a counterfactual scenario when workers are not
allowed to access home ownership and remain renters during their whole life.15 This way we
are reducing available choices to workers compared to the baseline model, but we allow them
to fully re-optimize given the new constraints they face. In this exercise, absent housing,
agents can make different decisions about the timing of their investment in education (as
well as about how much time to spend on human capital accumulation) than in the baseline.
Two clear trends emerge in Table 1.10: first, graduate school enrollment increases for both
groups (low and high indebted graduates). Second, while highly indebted students still
choose to postpone enrollment, they do eventually enroll in the following years, while the
15

An equivalent assumption is that we are imposing ζ2 = 0 while leaving all other parameters unchanged
from the baseline estimation
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baseline model suggests strong horizon effects. Switching costs (i.e. limited transferability
of human capital) and borrowing constraints still matter, and determine the difference
in enrollment patterns between graduates with different debt balances. Notice, however,
that even in this context enrollment should not necessarily be identical along the debt
distribution, to the extent that correlation with learning ability is different from zero - as
turns out to be the case according to the estimates of our baseline model.
Increased enrollment in post-bachelor programs and the missing concern of savings in order
to respect the downpayment constraint and then pay the mortgage have strong earnings
effects, as shown in Figure 1.10. In this case, the change takes place mostly on the
human capital investment side. Yearly earning differentials between high and low indebted
graduates at age 30 goes from $9.300 to $5.200, and at age 40 from $7.700 to $4.600.

Table 1.10: Enrollment with and without Housing
Graduate School Enrollment

Student Debt

Total

< $22.560 > $22.560
Graduate School Enrollment at Age 26
Baseline

24.4%

17.29%

22.03%

No Housing

52.83%

29.4%

45.02%

Baseline

34.68%

27.50%

32.29%

No Housing

65.29%

45.84%

58.86%

Overall Graduate School Enrollment

Source: model estimates.
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Figure 1.10: Life-Cycle Earnings (Baseline vs. no Homeownership)
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Source: model estimates.

1.7. Policy
1.7.1. A ”Debt to Equity Swap”: Income Based Repayment
Income Based Repayment plans are a popular solution to broadening access to higher education, as countries like Australia and Great Britain made them their baseline program for
student finance (see Chapman (2016)). During recent years, changes to old repayment
plans and the creation of new ones have expanded generous income-based repayment options to a growing number of borrowers in the US (Figure 1.11). Unlike fixed payment
plans, there is no set horizon of loan repayment; instead, the borrower pays a percent of
discretionary income each month until the loan is paid off.
In this section, an income repayment plan in every period is introduced in the model as
an alternative repayment scheme. The income repayment plan is defined to replicate the
Pay As You Earn Repayment Plan (PAYE) introduced in 2012: 10 percent of discretionary
income for 20 years and at the end of the repayment period, remaining balances are forgiven
and the forgiven amount is considered as additional income, to be taxed at a 25% rate.
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Figure 1.11: Evolution of Repayment Plans

Source: Federal Student Aid Data. Percentage of student loan borrowers enrolled in repayment plans as well
as the percentage amount of student debt each repayment plan represents. Includes outstanding principal
and interest balances of Direct Loan borrowers in Repayment, Deferment, and Forbearance.

We rewrite the recursive problem in (1.8), as the other problems are analogous:
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(1.15)

where:


 B
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+ σ0B,r , Vr,t+1
+ σ0G,r , Vo,t+1
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A quantitative exercise is necessary to assess the extent to which income based repayment
plans moderate the effects of initial student loan debt. On the one hand, enrollment in
income driven repayment plans reduces the ratio of student loan payments to monthly
wages, increasing disposable income. On the other hand, it can extend the repayment period
significantly relative to a 10-year plan, thereby potentially increasing the total interest paid
by the student loan borrower over the life of the loan.
The latter effect is the main reason why enrollment under IBR rises, but due mostly to
higher enrollment by high ability graduates. However, facing increasing payments during
age 25-35, and a small risk of having to pay a lump sum tax in the late 30s because of residual
balance forgiveness, workers under IBR delay entry into home ownership even more (see
Figure 1.12). After age 45, income effects start to dominate and overall home ownership
grows compared to baseline.
As shown in this section, linking repayment to income does help alleviating financial constraints. Even if the program did not achieve full participation of graduates, the growth
in IBR enrollment can be credited with moderating the impact of the significant growth in
undergraduate debt balances occurred between 2008 and 2016.
1.7.2. Evaluating a Radical Policy: Debt Forgiveness for All
As student debt became a prominent issue in the public debate, various political actors
have called for some sort of forgiveness plan. In this chapter we introduce debt forgiveness
under a balanced budget constraint, assuming the government can forgive all debt and then
finance this program by spreading lump sum taxation over the life cycle of workers. This
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exercise wipes out all of undergraduate debt, and replaces it with lump sum taxes levied
over the life cycle to keep the reform under a balanced budget.
According to our model, a forgiveness plan would have a large impact on post bachelor
enrollment. While adoption of an IBR plan would increase enrollment in post-bachelor
plans to 38%, forgiveness would bring it to 44% (see Figure 1.12). It would both increase
overall participation in graduate programs, and do it in particular during early years. The
second effect comes from the disappearance of the delaying motive that induces indebted
graduates to postpone enrollment, while the first is a result of the relaxing of borrowing
constraints on the same group.
Given larger enrollment, it is not surprising that entry into home ownership is almost
unchanged, as income effects move workers in the opposite direction. What happens, in fact,
is that there is a small delay in access to home purchases, driven by increased enrollment.
The overall impact on earnings and later age home ownership, however, is not substantially
larger than under the Income Based Repayment alternative plan.
This effect on earnings comes from the differential impact the two plans have on sorting
into graduate school: IBR achieves higher enrollment by a sharp increase in the enrollment
of high ability individuals. On the other hand, forgiveness has negative effects on sorting,
as it also increases the participation of workers with lower learning ability. This has a large
impact on endogenous human capital accumulation which is the main driver of earnings
growth. Lower ability workers enroll at a higher rate (and borrow for graduate studies),
but their net monetary gain is small, and their endogenous human capital investment at
age 30-35 is reduced compared to the baseline scenario where they had repaid their residual
debt by that age.
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Figure 1.12: Baseline vs. Alternative Repayment Plans

Earnings (baseline)
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Source: model estimates.
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1.8. Conclusions
What are the implications of higher levels of student debt on college graduates choices?
In accordance with previous empirical studies, we find that graduating with higher levels
of student debt causes higher earnings right after college. Nevertheless, we also show that
higher indebtedness implies lower earnings growth in the years after graduation. We then
argue that this is the result of student debt influencing human capital and career choices of
college graduates. In particular, we find that individuals with higher levels of student debt
are less likely to enroll in post bachelor degree programs.
We contribute to the existing literature by showing that horizon effects determined by
preferences for home-ownership are an important channel for obtaining this result. While
credit constraints are a necessary ingredient for initial financial conditions to affect life cycle
outcomes, their interaction with a strong value attached to homeownership is able to create
a wide gap between outcomes of workers that start their careers with different student debt
balances.
Several policies have been advocated to help student loan borrowers. We contribute to the
policy debate by showing the merits of two alternative proposals. One, that is redistributive
in nature, is to operate with a widespread forgiveness plan of all undergraduate debt,
financed by lump sum taxes to be repayed over an extended period of time by the same
cohort whose debt was forgiven.
The other, that resembles closely the path chosen so far, aims at alleviating the burden of
student debt by linking repayments to earnings. We show that the income based repayment
plan (IBR) is able to achieve results that are quantitatively similar to more ambitious
forgiveness programs - namely, that the IBR that already attracts a significant number of
graduates is already an effective policy to reduce career and human capital accumulation
distortions induced by student borrowing.
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In future work, we plan to move in two directions. The first is to endogenize the college
borrowing decision, by modeling undergraduate attendance, and nest our life cycle structure into a general equilibrium framework. After doing that, we will aim at comparing
more comprehensive policies regarding education financing, human capital, and life cycle
decisions.
Another important question to address requires extending the housing decision part of the
model to allow for heterogeneity in housing size and location choice. The decline of interstate migration in the U.S. has long been associated with reduced labor market dynamism,
although recent research pointed at it resulting from a reduction of the component of occupation specific human capital. In presence of location choices, housing becomes not only
an investment, but can also be an obstacle to geographical and labor mobility. Changes in
labor markets can thus have interactions with financial constraints, and generate interesting
macroeconomic implications.
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CHAPTER 2 : Upskilling and the Rise in College Inequality
2.1. Introduction
The college wage premium has increased substantially in recent decades in the United States,
with a recent slowdown since 2005. Much of the overall increase in inequality has been due to
an increase within education groups (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), Katz (1999)
and Hoxby and Terry (1999). Indeed, both the Gini coefficient as well as the ratio
between the upper and lower earnings quartiles have increased for college-educated workers
(Figure 2.1). This growth in inequality has happened at the same time of expansion in
participation in Higher Education, especially in 4-year colleges (Figure 2.2).
There seem to be three possibilities to explain this growing dispersion in earnings of collegeeducated workers (Hoxby and Terry (1999)): (1) a growing variation in the quality of
education (intensive margin), (2) a widening inequality in the abilities of students enrolling
in college (extensive margin) and (3) an increasing rate of returns to human capital or a
greater variance in the occupations that college-educated workers select into. In this article,
I analyze the evolving role of the higher education market (intensive margin) in shaping
earnings inequality between 2000 and 2018 in the United States1 .
Inequality among colleges has long been acknowledged (Bowen (1981) and Desrochers
and Wellman (2011)). However, there is disagreement about college inequality trends in
the past decades. Several papers have found that inequality has been stable over the period
2001-2010 (Halffman and Leydesdorff (2010) and Lau and Rosen (2016)). Taking
a longer-term perspective, Davies and Zarifa (2012), Clotfelter (2017) and Capelle
(2019) document a widening gap and increase in the Gini coefficient in college revenues
and expenditures per student since 1970.
1

Lindley and McIntosh (2015) focuses on the second and third channel and show that both have
played an important role in explaining growing college graduate wage inequality in the United Kingdom.
They show that average college entrance test scores within majors declined over time, suggesting that
the widening variance of test scores is due to universities accepting individuals from lower in the ability
distribution.
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Figure 2.1: Earnings inequality (college-educated workers)
(a) Annual Earnings (with some college)

(b) Annual Earnings (with a 4-year degree)

Source: CPS-ASEC supplement (age 25-30, employed full-time). Figure (a) includes workers with some
college but no degree, Associate’s degree, Bachelor’s degree and post-Bachelor’s degree. Figure (b) includes
workers with a Bachelor’s degree. Lines represent smoothed trend.

The main source of data used in this article comes from the College Scorecard Data, an
online tool created by the United States Department of Education designed to provide
reliable college information for students. College-level data files contain information for each
university from 1996 to 2018. It contains information on college revenues, expenditures,
cost of attendance, and average graduation rates (among many other variables). Data
on federally aided students is linked to earnings data from administrative tax records to
estimate median earnings among workers 6 to 10 years after first enrolling in college.
Following the literature on education and industrial organization (Epple, Romano and
Sieg (2006), Epple et al. (2017) and Gordon and Hedlund (2019)), I assume that
colleges maximize the quality they offer to students subject to a budget constraint. I assume
a Cobb Douglas functional form of college quality: colleges are a technology that deliver
to students a quality that depends on instructional expenditure per student and average
ability of students. I also assume that dispersion in students ability affects college quality.
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I model median post-college students earnings as a function of college quality. There is
empirical evidence that relates post-college earnings to college quality. Black and Smith
(2006) estimate a model in which college quality is a latent variable affecting post-college
wages of students. Hoekstra (2009) looks at earnings of white males ten to fifteen years
after high school graduation and finds a premium of 20% for students who attended the
most selective state university. Andrews, Li and Lovenheim (2016) finds substantial
heterogeneity in post-college earnings attributable to variation in college quality.
According to this earnings specification, the parameters of the production function of college
quality can be identified using regression analysis. The point estimates suggest that college
preparedness has a higher weight on explaining variation in college earnings relative to
expenditure per student. On average, an increase of 10% in instructional expenditure per
student (roughly a $1,100 increase, from an average of $11,000) is associated with an increase
in 1% on median earnings 10 years after enrollment. On average, an increase in 10% in
midpoint ACT composite score (approximately an increase of 2.3 points from an average of
23) is associated with an increase in 6% on median earnings 10 years after enrollment.
I then document three main trends in college inequality between 2000 and 2018. First,
inequality in post-college students earnings has increased both within public and within
private non-profit institutions. Second, inequality in both instructional expenditure per
student and average ability of students have also increased within sectors (and maintains
an increasing trend). Third, this growing variation in the quality of higher education is
consistent with an increase in inequality in net tuition revenue and an increase in relative
demand (especially for private non-profit doctoral universities).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the major reasons
behind the recent increase in college participation, section 2.3 describes the data and the
construction of the variables, section 2.4 explains the methodology used and shows the
main empirical results for the trends in college inequality, section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2. Upskilling
Increasing participation in Higher Education, and the increasing number of college-educated
workers in the labor market, is likely to change the post-college earnings distribution. College enrollment and attainment have increased substantially in the United States, especially
for 4-year colleges. As we can see in Figure 2.2a, first-time enrollment at 4-year colleges
has increased from 1.1 to 1.7 million students and the percentage of recent 4-year college
graduates (aged 25-30) increased from 25% to 40% between 1996 and 2019. The increase
in enrollment and attainment in community colleges has been much less pronounced2 , with
a recent decline in enrollment (Figure A2.1).

Figure 2.2: College Enrollment and Attainment
(b) Some College

(a) 4-year College

Source: IPEDS/College Scorecard and CPS-ASEC supplement. Figure (a) includes first-time undergraduate
students enrolled in a predominantly Bachelor’s degree granting institution and individuals aged 25-30 with
at least a Bachelor’s degree. Figure (b) includes first-time undergraduate students enrolled in some college
and individuals aged 25-30 with some college but no degree, Associate’s degree, Bachelor’s degree and
post-Bachelor’s degree. Lines represent smoothed trend.
2
The 2-year degree program in the US is also known as ”Associate Degree”. Schools offering such
program are known as a community college. They are 2-year colleges which provide affordable post-secondary
education as a pathway to a 4-year degree. These colleges are regulated by the state government or local
districts.
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Figure 2.3: High School Graduates and Financial Aid
(a) High School Graduates

(b) Financial Aid per FTE student

Source: IPEDS/College Scorecard, CPS-ASEC supplement, College Board Trends in Student Aid. Figure
(a) includes individuals aged 18-22 with a High School Diploma. Line represents smoothed trend. Figure
(b) shows trends in average aid per Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) undergraduate students in 2018 dollars over
time. In blue, average total aid per full-time equivalent students (FTE), in red, average grant aid per FTE
(short dashed) and average federal and non-federal Loans per FTE (dashed).

Researchers from a multitude of fields have studied factors promoting college enrollment,
focusing both on academic preparation and financial access to college. In 2001, the federal
government passed a reform of American elementary and secondary education known as
the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). In particular, NCLB required schools to close the
achievement gaps in K-12 education. Since then, there’s been a significant increase in the
percentage of high school graduates (Figure 2.3a).
There have also been several educational reforms promoting financial access to college, increasing both grant and loan eligibility and limits3 . Between 1990 and 2019, average grants
per full-time equivalent (FTE) undergraduate student increased from $3,218 to $9,518 and
average loans (federal and non-federal) per FTE undergraduate student increased from
$1,730 to $5,366 in 2018 dollars. Overall, average aid (grants and loans) per FTE undergraduate student (in 2018 dollars) tripled over this period (Figure 2.3b).
3

For example, the re-authorization of the Higher Education Act (1992) introduced an unsubsidized loan
program and increased the borrowing limit from $17,250 to $23,000 for dependent students. In 2008, the
Ensuring Cont. Access to Student Loans Act increased borrowing limit to $31,000 for dependent students.
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The empirical literature on the impact of college financial aid has mostly focused on its
effects on enrollment and attainment, and concludes that $1,000 increase in grants increases
the likelihood of enrollment between 3 and 5 percentage points4 . Dynarski (2003) shows
that increasing $1,000 in grants increases by 0.16 years the completed schooling of high
school graduates that attend college. Bettinger (2004) provides evidence that the Pell
Grants increases college persistence and completion.
However, Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) find that once allowing for equilibrium
considerations, the impact of subsidies on college enrollment is one order of magnitude
smaller than previously reported. A key characteristic of the model used to examine the
equilibrium effect of educational policies is that it is set in a competitive equilibrium environment, with the impact on earnings resulting from the diminishing rate of return to
labor in an aggregate production function. In this vein, Shephard and Sidibe (2019)
build a general equilibrium search model and find that $1,000 tuition subsidy generates a 2
percentage point increase in college graduation.
Other studies look at the effect of student loans on college enrollment and attainment5 . For
example, the models in Ionescu (2009) and Ionescu (2011) show that flexibility in the
loan repayment increases college enrollment significantly. Dynarski (2002) finds that an
increase of $1,000 in federal subsidised loans increases college attainment by 1.7 percentage
points (for students from households who own housing equity).
Nevertheless, this recent expansion in financial aid has been accompanied by an increasing
cost of college. Between 2000–01 and 2017–18, prices for undergraduate tuition, fees, room,
and board at public 4-year colleges rose by 63 percent, and prices at private nonprofit 4-year
colleges by 39 percent, after adjustment for inflation6 .
4

See Deming and Dynarski (2009) for a review of estimates.
Mattana and Joensen (2016) analyze how financial aid design (grants vs. loans) affect student
behavior and achievement. A growing literature provides evidence that student loans have a negative impact
on post-college outcomes. For a review of this literature see Folch and Mazzone (2021).
6
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2019). Digest of
Education Statistics, 2018 (NCES 2020-009), Chapter 3.
5
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Gordon and Hedlund (2019) develop a model of higher education to test explanations
for this increase in college tuition. Their model extends the static framework in Epple,
Romano and Sieg (2006) and Epple et al. (2017) of imperfectly competitive, quality maximizing colleges, embedded in an incomplete market life-cycle environment. They
analyze three driving forces: supply-side changes (Baumol’s cost disease and exogenous
changes to non-tuition revenue), demand-side changes (expansion in financial aid, i.e. the
Bennett Hypothesis), and macroeconomic forces (higher college earnings premium). Their
model shows that demand-driven factors are the largest driving force behind the increase
in college enrollment and tuition revenue.
Finally, structural shifts in the labor market can also have an impact on the educational
choices of workers. The college earnings premium has increased substantially in recent
decades, with a recent slowdown since 2005 (Beaudry, Green and Sand (2016), Valletta (2018) and Autor, Goldin and Katz. (2020)). Nevertheless, as shown in Figure
2.2, this recent stagnation has occurred during a period of rapid expansion in college enrollment.
Higher demand for college educated workers (employer skill upgrading) is consistent with
the increasing supply of college educated workers and the recent flattening of the college
wage premium. As Figure 2.4 shows, the percentage of jobs requiring a Bachelor’s degree
has increased, from 25% of jobs requiring a BA degree in the typical occupation in 2003-2006
to 35% in 2014-2019. In particular, using detailed job vacancy data, Blair and Deming
(2020) show that the share of job vacancies requiring a bachelor’s degree increased by more
than 60 percent between 2007 and 2019, suggesting that upskilling is probably here to stay,
and that four-year college enrollment will keep growing.
To sum up, three major factors have contributed to the substantial increase in college participation over the last decades: increasing proportion of high school graduates, expansion
of college financial aid, and, structural shifts in the labor market.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of Occupations (by BA requirements)

Source: Occupational Information Network (O*NET), percent frequency data associated with Education,
Training, and Experience Content Model elements. Figure plots the cumulative distribution of the percentage
of jobs within occupation that require at least a Bachelor’s degree. Distribution is computed from a panel
of 335 occupations that contain information about education requirements in 2003-2006 and 2014-2019.
Dashed line represents the median at both points in time.

2.3. Data: College Scorecard
2.3.1. Data Description
The main source of data used in this article comes from the College Scorecard Data. The
College Scorecard is an online tool, created by the United States Department of Education,
designed to provide reliable information for students to compare the cost and quality of
universities in the United States. The data provide information about colleges that receive federal financial aid7 , and the outcomes of the students attending those universities.
The data is obtained through three main sources: federal reporting from colleges, federal
financial aid, and tax-level information8 .
7

Some colleges that do not participate in Title IV programs are also included if they meet similar criteria
to Title IV participating colleges.
8
For more information about the data see the technical documentation for institutional-level data files
(Department of Education (2021)).
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The data files contain information for each college from 1996-97 to 2018-19 academic years.
The data cover college and students characteristics, college expenditures and revenues,
financial aid, cost of attendance, and graduation rates (among many other variables). In
addition, I merge the College Scorecard data with college-level data from the Integrated
Postsecondary Data System (IPEDS) to add additional variables that are not included in
the Scorecard database9 .
To gain insight into the labor market outcomes of students, data on federally aided students
(those who receive federal grants and loans) is linked to earnings data from administrative
tax records. These data are used to produce aggregated estimates of college-level statistics,
such as the median earnings among workers 6 to 10 years after first enrolling in an institution.10 . Students who are identified as currently enrolled (determined by having a federal
loan that is in in-school deferment) are excluded from the calculation.
To ensure data are stable from year to year and representative of a certain number of
students, the data are pooled across two cohorts. For example, median earnings 6 years
after enrollment in 2014 is reflective of all federally aided students that enrolled in academic
years 2007-08 and 2008-09. Moreover, colleges with fewer than 30 federally aided students
are not included to ensure data are representative.
Since 2014, earnings data are limited to one-year post-completion, and are calculated for
individual fields of study (where sufficient data is available). Hence, aggregated collegelevel median earnings 6 and 10 years after enrollment cover the period between 2003-2014.
Other college-level data (cost of attendance, expenditure per student, tuition revenue...)
are available for the full panel 2000-201911 .
9

See Appendix 2.1 for a detailed description of the data and the variables used.
Earnings are defined as the sum of wages and deferred compensation from all W-2 forms received for
each student, plus self-employment earnings from Schedule SE.
11
All nominal variables (median earnings, instructional expenditure per student, net tuition revenue per
student and endowment assets) are inflation adjusted to 2018 prices.
10

62

I keep non-profit colleges12 that are predominantly bachelor’s-degree granting institutions.
I drop from the sample community colleges, tribal and special focus colleges (engineering
schools, business, arts and music...), U.S. Service schools, non-main campuses and universities in Outlying Areas (AS, FM, GU, MH, MP, PR, PW, VI). I keep colleges with earnings
data for all the years of analysis (2002-2014). The resulting panel consists of 1,266 colleges.
2.3.2. Summary statistics
Table 2.1 displays the main summary statistics for the first year that contains post-college
earnings information (2003/04) and the last academic year in the sample (2018/19). Importantly, statistics differ substantially depending if they are measured at the college-level or
student-level. For example, 66% of non-profit 4-year colleges are private, but only 33% of
first-time undergraduate degree-seeking students attended those in 2003. For this reason,
all measures presented henceforth are student weighted13 .
Over time, the distribution of students across sectors, Carnegie classifications and regions
has remained stable. Instructional expenditure per student has increased both for public
and private non-profit universities. This increase in expenditure per student is consistent
with the increase in the net tuition revenue per student in both sectors. The average and
standard deviation of college entrance test score (ACT composite score) have increased,
as well as the percentage of low-income students (those with family income lower than $
30,000).
As we can see in Figure 2.5a, there is substantial dispersion in the distribution of collegelevel median earnings 6 years after enrollment in 2014 (the last year with earnings data
available). The distribution becomes more unequal ten years after enrollment, suggesting
that differences amplify over time. As expected, the distribution of median earnings 6 years
after enrollment is more dispersed for private non-profit universities (Figure 2.5b).
12

Only 6% (2%) of first-time students enrolled in a (4-year) for-profit college in 2018.
Weights are computed using analytic weights, treating each observation as if each observation is a mean
computed from a sample of size n, where n is the total number of first-time undergraduate degree-seeking
students in a given year.
13
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics (4-year non-profit colleges)
2003/04

2018/19

College-level

Student-level

College-level

Student-level

Public

37%

67%

37%

69%

Private non-profit

63%

33%

63%

31%

Baccalaureate Colleges

29%

11%

29%

9%

Institutional characteristics

Master’s Colleges & Universities

43%

30%

43%

30%

Doctoral Universities

29%

59%

29%

61%

$ 8,160.9

$ 9,133.6

$ 10,045.0

$ 11,729.2

[3781.8]

[4214.6]

[4517.4]

[5804.2]

$ 11,924.9

$ 14,921.9

$ 12,443.1

$ 16,587.7

[11503.3]

[13558.0]

[11195.2]

[15900.5]

Public

$ 5,633.8

$ 6,174.1

$ 8,396.5

$ 10,361.7

[2928.6]

[2758.3]

[3969.7]

[4879.5]

Private non-profit

$ 15,997.6

$ 17,714.5

$ 17,234.9

$ 20,596

[12151.0]

[11155.1]

[7057.7]

[8109.1]

Instructional expenditure per FTE student (2018 Dollars)
Public

Private non-profit

Net tuition revenue per FTE student (2018 Dollars)

Regions (Bureau of Economic Analysis)
New England (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT)

9%

7%

9%

7%

Mideast (DE, DC, MD, NJ, NY, PA)

19%

17%

19%

17%

Great Lakes (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI)

16%

18%

16%

17%

Plains (IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD)

11%

9%

11%

8%

Southeast (AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV)

25%

24%

25%

24%

Southwest (AZ, NM, OK, TX)

7%

9%

7%

10%

Rocky Mountains (CO, ID, MT, UT, WY)

3%

4%

3%

4%

Far West (AK, CA, HI, NV, OR, WA)

10%

11%

10%

13%

22.9

23.5

23.8

25.3

[2.8]

[2.7]

[3.6]

[3.7]

29.3%

29.7%

33.9%

33.4%

[12.3]

[11.7]

[13.1]

[12.0]

52%

56%

57%

64%

[17]

[17]

[17]

[17]

$ 38,832.1

$ 40,183.7

$ 37,370.4

$ 39,331.72

[7242.3]

[6697.8]

[8469.6]

[8222.9]

1,266

1,233,607

1,266

1,512,115

Students characteristics and outcomes
ACT Composite score

Percentage with family income lower than $ 30,000

Graduation rate 6 years after enrollment

Median earnings 6 years after enrollment (2018

Dollars)∗

Observations

Source: College Scorecard Data and IPEDS. ∗ Median earnings observed in 2003/04 and 2014/15.
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of Outcomes (4-year colleges, 2014)
(a) Earnings 6 and 10 years after enrollment

(b) Earnings 6 years after enrollment (by sector)

(c) Graduation 6 and 8 years after enrollment

(d) Graduation 6 years after enrollment (by sector)

Source: College Scorecard Data. Graph represents the kernel density. Data is weighted using total first-time
undergraduate degree-seeking students.

Given that the measure of earnings is not conditional on educational attainment, the observed dispersion in post-college earnings also reflects dispersion in graduation rates. As
Figure 2.5c-d shows, the dispersion in graduation rates is also important, with private
non-profit colleges having higher graduation rates than public colleges.
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2.3.3. Trends in post-college students earnings inequality
In this section, I show recent trends in college-level earnings inequality. I focus on median
earnings 6 years after enrollment as it contains more years for the panel of colleges (2003,
2005, 2007, 2009, 2011-2014) than 10 years after enrollment (2007, 2009, 2011-2014). I
consider two measures of inequality, the Gini coefficient and the ratio of earnings between
the 95th (90th) percentile and 5th (10th) percentile. All trends have been smoothed.
As we can see in Figure 2.6a, earnings inequality 6 years after enrollment for 4-year nonprofit colleges has increased14 over the period 2003-2014. Most of the increase happened
between the tails of the distribution: the Gini coefficient increased from 0.09 to 0.11, the
ratio 95/5 from 1.7 to 1.9 and the ratio 90/10 from 1.5 to 1.6. Within sectors (Figure
2.6b), the increase in the Gini coefficient is more pronounced in private non-profit colleges,
from 0.105 to 0.14.
Figure 2.6: Post-college Earnings Inequality (4-year colleges)
(a) Gini coefficient and ratio of percentiles

(b) Gini coefficient (by sector)

Source: College Scorecard Data. College-level median earnings are weighted using total first-time undergraduate degree-seeking students.
14

These results also hold using median earnings 10 years after enrollment. See Figure A2.2
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The majority of undergraduate students attend a college within the same state of residency15 , and hence, it is also important to understand the trend in inequality within
regions. The increase in inequality is generalized within regions but presents substantial
heterogeneity (Figure A2.3). The regions with the highest Gini coefficient (in 2014) are
New England, Mideast and Southeast, with Georgia, Washington, D.C, Massachusetts,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and New York being the states with higher
post-college students earnings inequality (Table A2.1).

2.4. The Increase in College Inequality
2.4.1. Modeling college quality
Given that I focus on non-profit 4-year colleges (which account for 95% of 4-year colleges
in the US), I follow the literature on education and industrial organization and assume
that colleges maximize the quality they offer to students, denoted by (qc,t ), subject to a
budget constraint (Ψc,t ). This micro-foundation of the college sector is borrowed from a
literature that estimates equilibrium models of higher education (Epple, Romano and
Sieg (2006), Epple et al. (2017) and Gordon and Hedlund (2019)).
Colleges can be modelled as clubs, as the ability of students attending matter for the
quality delivered to all students. There is empirical evidence that peer effects enter the
college quality production function. For example, Smith and Stange (2016) and Mehta,
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2018) provide evidence of the effects of peer-effects
(from roommates) on college outcomes. Zimmerman (2019) shows that social networks
built during college matter for the labor market. In addition, peer effects also arise from
colleges competing for high ability students (Hoxby (2009) and Hoxby (2013)).
15

72% of first-time undergraduate students enrolled in a Bachelor’s degree program in 2011/12 enroll in
the same state of residency (Beginning Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Study (BPS), NCES)
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Following this literature, I assume a Cobb Douglas functional form: colleges are a technology
that deliver to students a quality that depends on expenditure per student (xc,t ) and the
average ability of students (ac,t ). I also assume that the more heterogeneous the pool of
students in terms of ability, the more difficult it is for a college to deliver a given quality
to its students (as in Capelle (2020)). I define (σc,t ) as the logarithm of the withincollege dispersion of students ability. Hence, the production function of quality of college c
measured at time t is given by:

qc,t (θc , xc,t , f (ac,t )) = θc ·

xνc,t

aαc,t1
· α2
σc,t

(2.1)

Following Azuero and Zarruk Valencia (2017), I treat median earnings for students
that attended college c, τ years after enrollment as a function of college quality:

yc,t+τ = yt+τ · (1 + γt · qc,t )

(2.2)

where yt+τ represents the median salary for non-college workers and γt the returns to
education over time. According to this specification, the parameters of the production
function of college quality can be identified using regression analysis. I use median students
earnings 6 (and 10) years after enrollment for a panel of 1,299 colleges in the United States
through 2009-2014 (see Section 2.3). To measure the average (ac,t ) and dispersion (σc,t )
of students ability, I use the midpoint of the college entrance ACT composite score and
the difference between percentile 75th and percentile 25th . For xc,t , I use instructional
expenditures divided by the number of full-time equivalent students. As we can see in
Figure 2.7, both instructional expenditure per student and ACT scores have a strong
positive correlation with median earnings 6 years after first-time enrollment within public
and private non-profit colleges16 .
16

See Figure A2.4 for the correlation with median earnings 10 years after enrollment.
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Figure 2.7: Earnings, Expenditure per Student, ACT Score (2014)
(a) Expenditure (public)

(b) Expenditure (private non-profit)

(c) ACT score (public)

(d) ACT score (private non-profit)

Source: College Scorecard Data (2014). Data is weighted using total first-time undergraduate degree-seeking
students.

Private colleges are privately funded and funded mostly by endowment and donations as
well as tuition. They also tend to have highly selective admittance practices, offering a
smaller class size and therefore higher expenditure per student. Public colleges are instead
federally funded, offering lower tuition and higher admittance rates than private schools.
On average, public colleges have larger class sizes, lower expenditure per student and lower
college entrance scores.
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For every college (c) in the panel, the following earnings equation holds:

ln(

yc,t+τ
− 1) = ln(γt · qc,t )
yt+τ

(2.3)

Rearranging:

ln(

yc,t+τ
− 1) = ln(γt ) + ln(θc ) + νln(xc,t ) + α1 ln(ac,t ) − α2 ln(σc,t ) + ΓWc,t + c,t+τ (2.4)
yt+τ

Where yc,t+τ represents median earnings of undergraduate degree-seeking students attending college c, τ years after first-time enrollment, γt is a vector with cohort fixed effects, θc
is a vector of college controls (Sector, Carnegie classification and state fixed effects), xc,t
measures average instructional expenditure per student (6-year average since enrollment)
for students attending college c, ac,t is the midpoint test score (ACT) of admitted students
in college c, σc,t is the ACT quartile deviation of admitted students and Wc,t is a set of
students controls: percentage of low-income students (aided students with family income
lower than $30,000), percentage of high-income students (aided students with family income
higher than $75,000) and percentage of dependent students.
Family income is an important control to be included in the earnings regression as parental
background matters for achievements and access to college (Epple, Romano and Sieg
(2006), Bailey and Dynarski (2011) Chetty et al. (2019), Hoxby and Turner
(2019)). In addition, the ACT score theoretically provide an objective way to compare
students from different high schools. However, one concern about measuring ability of
students by standardized test scores is that these tests favor students with higher parents’
income and wealth (Dixon-Román, Everson and McArdle (2013)).
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The results of the estimation are displayed in Table 2.2. Columns (1) and (4) show the
parameter estimates including sector and cohort fixed effects, columns (2) and (5) add state
and Carnegie fixed effects, and, columns (3) and (6) include students controls.

Table 2.2: College Quality Production Function Estimates

log(Median Earnings)
6 years after enrollment

10 years after enrollment

τ =6

τ = 10

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.08∗∗∗

0.06∗∗∗

0.09∗∗∗

0.10∗∗∗

0.08∗∗∗

0.10∗∗∗

[0.005]

[0.004]

[0.005]

[0.008]

[0.007]

[0.007]

0.81∗∗∗

0.77∗∗∗

0.60∗∗∗

0.90∗∗∗

0.84∗∗∗

0.60∗∗∗

[0.021]

[0.019]

[0.023]

[0.034]

[0.029]

[0.036]

-0.06∗∗∗

-0.05∗∗∗

-0.04∗∗∗

-0.11∗∗∗

-0.07∗∗∗

-0.06∗∗∗

[0.0.009]

[0.008]

[0.008]

[0.015]

[0.013]

[0.013]

Sector and Cohort FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

State and Carnegie FE

N

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Student Controls

N

N

Y

N

N

Y

0.56

0.71

0.76

0.65

0.81

0.81

4,619

4,619

4,462

2,111

2,111

2,048

ν

α1

α2

Adj. R-squared
Observations

Standard errors in brackets.
Source: College Scorecard Data. Regressions are weighted using total first-time undergraduate degreeseeking students.
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The estimates show that the elasticities ν and α1 are both statistically significant in all
the specifications17 . As expected, the parameter α2 is negative and statistically significant.
This means that, on average, the dispersion in students ability is associated with lower
earnings after college enrollment.
The point estimates suggest that college preparedness has a higher weight on explaining
variation in college earnings compared to expenditure per student. On average, an increase
of 10% in instructional expenditure per student (roughly a $1,100 increase, from an average
expenditure of $11,000) is associated with an increase in 1% on median earnings 10 years
after enrollment. On average, an increase in 10% in the median ACT composite score
(approximately an increase of 2.3 points from an average score of 23) is associated with an
increase in 6% on median earnings 10 years after enrollment18 .
Given that the measure of earnings is not conditional on educational attainment, the observed variation in post-college earnings also reflects variation in graduation rates. Median
earnings τ years after enrollment can be expressed as follows:

yc,t+τ = (1 − pc,t+τ ) · yc,ng,t+τ + pc,t+τ · yc,g,t+τ

(2.5)

Where pc,t+τ reflects the percentage of students that graduated within τ years after firsttime enrollment, yc,ng,t+τ median earnings of drop-outs and yc,g,t+τ median earnings of
graduates. Table A2.3 shows the parameter estimates when using as dependent variable
graduation rates 6 and 8 years after first-time enrollment.
17

One potential bias in the measure of ability using ACT test scores is that the percentage of first-time
undergraduate students that took the ACT might be low in some colleges. In Table A2.2, I restrict the
sample to colleges with at least 50% of first-time degree/certificate-seeking students submitting ACT scores.
18
Table A2.2 shows similar coefficient results within public and private non-profit universities
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2.4.2. Evolution of college inequality
Understanding the production function of college quality helps to explain the contribution of
the intensive margin channel on increasing post-college earnings inequality. In this section,
I group 4-year non-profit colleges (within sector) between those above (below) the upper
(lower) earnings decile in 2014. I use this criteria to show the evolution in the ratio of
students post-college earnings (6 and 10 years after enrollment) over the period 2002-2014
as well as the ratios of college quality (expenditure and ACT scores) and tuition revenue
over the period 2002-2018.
Following Equation 2.4, these differences between groups (within sector, s) can be modeled
as follows:

∆ys,t = ln(ȳs,90,t ) − ln(ȳs,10,t )
= ν(ln(x̄s,90,t ) − ln(x̄s,10,t )) + α1 (ln(ās,90,t ) − ln(ās,10,t )) + us,t

(2.6)

= ν∆xs,t + α1 ∆as,t + us,t
I show three main results. First, as shown in section 2.3, the average difference in postcollege earnings between the upper and lower deciles has increased substantially both within
public and private non-profit universities (Figures 2.8a-b). Second, the ratios in average
expenditure per student and ACT test scores between these two groups have also increased
and maintain an increasing trend (Figures 2.8c-d). This increasing trend points to a continued increase in college quality and post-college earnings inequality for 2014-2018. Third,
according with colleges maximizing the quality they offer subject to a budget constraint,
(Figures 2.8e-f ) show that this increase in college inequality is consistent with an increase in net tuition revenue per student and an increase in relative demand (measured as
a decrease in the difference of the admitted-to-applicants ratio)19 .
19
In Appendix A2.2, I remove universities in the upper and lower percentile (Figure A2.5). Alternatively, I group colleges by their Carnegie classification instead of earnings deciles (Figure A2.6). The
trends remain in both cases. Figure A2.7 shows the evolution of ratios without grouping by sectors.
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Figure 2.8: Evolution of College Ratios
(a) ∆ys,t (6 years after enrollment)

(b) ∆ys,t (10 years after enrollment)

(c) ∆xs,t

(d) ∆as,t

(e) ∆ts,t

(f) ∆Ss,t
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When comparing the Carnegie classification between deciles (Table 2.3), colleges at the
upper earnings decile in 2014 consist mostly of research/doctoral universities: doctoral universities in the lower decile represent 25.72% (4.71%) of public (private non-profit) colleges,
while 89.68% (91.22%) in the upper decile.
One additional factor contributing to the increasing demand and net tuition revenue for
doctoral universities is the increase in enrollment from international students. International
students usually pay full tuition price, increasing net tuition revenues for colleges. The
number of international students attending 4-year colleges has increased substantially in
recent years (Figure A2.8), from 1.7% (4.1%) to 3.2% (7.5%) in public (private non-profit)
doctoral universities.
In addition to tuition revenue, there are two additional revenue sources for U.S. universities:
government funding and endowment assets (and private gifts)20 . Capelle (2019) shows
that both the average and the progressivity of government transfers to 4-year public colleges
have declined over 1980-2016. In addition, Lerner, Schoar and Wang (2008) document
growing differences in endowments for private colleges. As Figure A2.9 shows, endowment
per student for doctoral private non-profit universities has increased substantially.
Table 2.3: Carnegie Classification (2018)
Public

Private non-profit

Lower

Upper

Lower

Upper

Baccalaureate Colleges

12.20%

1.45%

59.24%

2.62%

Master’s Colleges & Universities

62.08%

8.87%

36.04%

6.16%

Doctoral Universities

25.72%

89.68%

4.71%

91.22%

First-time enrolled students

85,578

114,174

41,638

46,153

Source: College Scorecard Data and IPEDS.
20
Desrochers and Wellman (2011) report trends in college revenues over the period 1999–2009. Private
colleges rely mostly on tuition revenue and endowments, while public colleges rely mainly on government
funding and tuition revenue.
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2.5. Conclusions
The college wage premium has increased in recent decades, with a recent slowdown since
2005, despite substantial increases in 4-year college enrollment. Simple focus on wage differentials between educational groups can miss some of the overall recent change in earnings
inequality. Indeed, wage inequality within college-educated workers has increased substantially in the United States. In this paper, I show how a growing variation in the quality
of 4-year colleges (the intensive margin channel) has contributed to this increase in wage
inequality for college-educated workers.
I define colleges as a technology that deliver to students a quality that depends on instructional expenditure per student and average (and dispersion of) students ability. Using
college-level data linked to administrative students earnings records, I model post-college
students earnings as a function of college quality. According to this specification, the parameters of the production function of college quality can be identified using regression
analysis. The point estimates suggest that college preparedness has a higher weight on
explaining variation in college earnings relative to expenditure per student.
I then document three main trends in college inequality between 2002 and 2018. First,
inequality in post-college students earnings has increased both within public and within
private non-profit institutions. Second, inequality in both instructional expenditure per
student and average ability of students have also increased within sectors (and maintain an
increasing trend). Third, according with colleges maximizing the quality they offer subject
to a budget constraint, this growing variation in the quality of higher education is consistent
with an increase in inequality in net tuition revenue and an increase in the relative demand
(especially for private non-profit doctoral universities).
This increasing self-segregation of students across colleges emphasizes how attending college
per se does not compensate for a lower initial ability level and provide additional perspective
on why human capital investment before college is critical in shaping earnings inequality.
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APPENDIX
A1.1. Data
This section describes in more detail the data sources for the variables covered in Section
Section 1.3.
A1.1.1. B&B data
We use the restricted-use data and keep observations that have a positive value in the
weight variable wte000, which represents the students who received a bachelor’s degree in
the 2007-08 academic year and responded to all interviews (2007-08, 2009, and 2012). We
use the following variables:
Debt:
Cumulative loan amount borrowed for undergraduate through 2007-08 (b1borat):
Indicates the cumulative amount borrowed from all sources for the respondent’s undergraduate education through June 30, 2008. Does not include Parent PLUS loans. We
log-transform this variable and deal with zero values by adding $1.
Post College outcomes:
2012 Current Primary Job Salary (b2cjsal): Indicates the respondent’s annualized
salary from their current or most recent primary job. Primary job is defined as the respondent’s current or most recent job that lasted more than 3 months. We replace with
a zero value the earnings of those who were not working at the time of the interview but
reported the most recent earnings. We log-transform this variable and deal with zero values
by adding $1.
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2009 Current Primary Job Salary (b1erninc): Indicates the respondent’s income from
their current job as of the B&B:09 interview. For respondents with multiple jobs, salary
is only for the primary job, the job at which the respondent worked the most hours. We
log-transform this variable and deal with zero values by adding $1.
2012 Current Value of Primary Residence (b2fhomval): Indicates the approximate
current value of the respondent’s home(s), as reported by the respondent in the B&B:12
interview. We classify as home owners those observations with a value higher than zero.
For the value of the house, we consider houses with a value higher than $100,000 and
log-transform the variable.
Highest degree attained since bachelor’s as of 2012 (b2hideg): Identifies the highest postsecondary degree or certificate the respondent had obtained after completing the
2007-08 bachelor’s degree, as of the BB:12 interview. Variable categories are: Did not earn
degree, Undergraduate certificate or diploma, Associate’s degree, Additional bachelor’s degree, Post-baccalaureate certificate...and Doctoral degree - other.
College Group Fixed Effects:
Institution Sector in 2007/08 (sector4): Indicates the sector of the 2007-08 bachelor’s
degree-granting institution, using five categories. Variable categories are: Public 4-year,
Private nonprofit 4-year, Public 2-year, For-profit, and Others or attended more than one
institution. WE keep Public 4-year and Private nonprofit 4-year colleges.
Carnegie code (2005 basic, collapsed) for 2007-08 institution (cc2005c): Indicates
the Carnegie basic institution classification code, using collapsed categories, of the 2007-08
bachelor’s degree-granting institution. Variable categories are: Associate’s, Research and
doctoral, Master’s, Baccalaureate, and Special focus and other. We drop Associate’s and
Special focus and other institutions.
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Selectivity of 2007-08 bachelor’s degree institution (selectv2): Indicates the level
of selectivity of the 2007-08 bachelor’s degree-granting institution. Only applies to public
and private nonprofit 4-year institutions; other institutions were set to zero. The selectivity measure was developed for IPEDS, for public or private nonprofit 4-year institutions
using the following criteria: whether the institution was open admission (no minimal requirements), the number of applicants, the number of students admitted, the 25t h and
75t h percentiles of ACT and/or SAT scores, and whether or not test scores were required.
Variable categories are: Very selective, Moderately selective, Minimally selective, and Open
admission.
Individual Controls:
Date of first postsecondary enrollment (pse date): Identifies the year and month,
in YYYYMM format, when the respondent first enrolled in postsecondary education. We
keep those students that enroll between 2002 and 2004.
Expected Family Contribution in 2007-08 (efc): Indicates the composite estimate of
the federal expected family contribution (EFC) used in 2007-08 need analysis.
Dependency status in 2007/2008 (depend): Indicates the respondent’s dependency
status during the 2007-08 academic year.
SAT I score (tesatder): Indicates the respondent’s SAT I combined score, derived as
either the sum of SAT I verbal and math scores or the ACT composite score converted to
an estimated SAT I combined score using a concordance table from the following source:
Dorans, N.J. (1999). Correspondences Between ACT and SAT I Scores (College Board
Report No. 99-1).
Field of Study (majors4y): Indicates the respondent’s major or field of study, using
10 categories, for the 2007-08 bachelor’s degree. Variable categories are: Computer and
information sciences; Engineering and engineering technology; Bio and phys science, sci
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tech, math, agriculture; General studies and other; Social Sciences, Humanities, Healthcare, Business, Education and Other Applied. We classify them in three categories: STEM
and health-care, Social Sciences and Business, Other.
Race/Ethnicity (race): Indicates the respondent’s race/ethnicity with Hispanic or Latino
origin as a separate category. Variable categories are: White, Black or African American,
Hispanic or Latino, Asian, American Indian or Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian, other and
More than one race. We classify them into four categories: White, Black, Latino, Asian,
Other.
Gender (gender): Indicates the respondent’s sex.
A1.1.2. IPEDS data
Using harmonized college identifiers, we merge the B&B individual level data with institution level from the Institutional Post-Secondary Database (IPEDS). We use the IPEDS
data in order to get information about the cost of attendance as well as the amount of
grants and loans at the institutional level. We use the following variables for 2004-2007
from the IPEDS data center:
Student Debt:
Average amount of student loans awarded to full-time first-time undergraduates
(loan): Any monies that must be repaid to the lending institution for which the student
is the designated borrower. Includes all Title IV subsidized and unsubsidized loans and
all institutionally- and privately-sponsored loans. Does not include PLUS and other loans
made directly to parents.
Percent of full-time first-time undergraduates awarded student loans (ploan):
Percentage of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who
were awarded student loans.
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Institutional Grants:
Average amount of institutional grant aid awarded to full-time first-time undergraduates (grant): Scholarships and fellowships granted and funded by the institution
and/or individual departments within the institution, (i.e., instruction, research, public
service) that may contribute indirectly to the enhancement of these programs.
Percent of full-time first-time undergraduates awarded institutional grant aid
(pgrant): Percentage of full-time, first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduate students who were awarded institutional grants (scholarships/fellowships).
Grant-to-Aid:
Some of the institutions have a missing value in grants or loans and at the same time
the percentage of students who were awarded grants or loans is zero. We substitute these
observations with a zero value in grants or loans. We then drop all colleges with a grant-toaid of 0 or 100 in any of the six years (2002-2007). Given that the average sum (and percent)
of institutional grant and loan amounts are not available for 2002-2007, we construct the
total institutional grant-to-aid ratio in the following way:

aidj,t = ploanj,t loanj,t +pgrantj,t grantj,t = (

Grantj,t
Recipientj,t
T otalDebtj,t Indebtedj,t
)(
)+(
)(
)
Indebtedj,t Studentsj,t
Recipientj,t Studentsj,t

Grant

xj,t =

Recipient

j,t
j,t
( Recipient
)( Studentsj,t
)
j,t

aidj,t
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A1.2. Solution Method
A1.2.1. Discrete-Continuous Choices
We illustrate how we take into account discrete choices with the problem of an employed
renter with student loans, as in the Bellman Equation (1.8). For illustrative purposes only,
we assume no borrowing constraints. If the worker had no discrete choices to make, the
Bellman equation for the optimal consumption of a worker would satisfy the following first
order condition known as the Euler equation:

0 = u0c (c, s) − β(1 + r)E u0c (c0 , s0 )



(A.1)

However, since at any period the renter worker can choose two discrete choices (to become a
homeowner or switch career), the problem at the state vector point {a, h, j, d, e, t} involves
solving for all the possible combinations of available discrete choices.
Following Iskhakov et al. (2017), we assume instead that the discrete choices are affected
by choice-specific taste shocks, σe εt , i.i.d. Extreme Value type I distributed with scale
parameter σε as in McFadden (1973).
Taking again the value function in (1.8). Abstracting from career and repayment choice,
and focusing only on the home-ownership decision, the expected value of the future value
function becomes:

E[V 0 ] = max E[Vr (k 0 , h0 , j 0 , m0 , d0 , e0 , t + 1)], E[Vo,λ (k 0 , h0 , j 0 , m0 , d0 , e0 , t + 1)] =
= max E[Vr (·, t + 1) + σε ε(o)], E[Vo,λ (·, t + 1) + σε ε(r)] =


= σε log exp{Vr (·, t + 1)/σε } + exp{Vo,λ (·, t + 1)/σε }
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(A.2)

Thus, the Euler equation for a renter can then be written as:

h
0 = u0c (c, s)−β(1 + r)E u0c (c0 , s0 > 1) · P (s0 > 1|k 0 , h0 , j 0 , m0 , d0 , e0 )
i
+ u0c (c0 , s0 = 1) · P (s0 = 1|k 0 , h0 , j 0 , m0 , d0 , e0 )

(A.3)

where P (s0 > 1) and P (s0 = 1) are conditional choice probabilities given by the binomial
logit formula:

exp{Vo,λ (·, t + 1)/σε }
exp{Vo,λH (·, t + 1)/σε } + exp{Vr (·, t + 1)/σε }
(A.4)
exp{Vr (·, t + 1)/σε }
0
0 0 0
0 0 0
P (s = 1|k , h , j , m , d , e ) =
exp{Vo,λ (·, t + 1)/σε } + exp{Vr (·, t + 1)/σε }

P (s0 > 1|k 0 , h0 , j 0 , m0 , d0 , e0 ) =

A1.2.2. Borrowing constraints
Solving (1.8) requires taking care of an additional issue. Formally, given the state S and
indicating the Euler equation as φ : S×Rm → R, and the policy function as k 0 : S×Rm → R,
one needs to find policy and multiplier (k 0 , µ) ∈ R × R s.t.

φ(S, k 0 , µ) = 0 , k 0 ≥ φ ⊥ µ ≥ 0

(A.5)

Following Garcia and Zangwill (1981), this problem can be transformed into a system of
two equations, and can then be solved using standard solution algorithms for root finding.
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Define a variable α such that:

α≡




µ,

if µ ≥ 0, k 0 = φ
(A.6)



−k 0 , if µ = 0, k 0 ≥ φ

and

α+ = (max(0, α))k
(A.7)
α− = (max(0, −α))k
where k ∈ N+ . The variable acts like a ”penalty” when the constraint is violated, forcing
the algorithm to search in the feasible set. The problem can be rewritten as finding policies
and α such that:

φ(S, k 0 , α+ ) = 0 , k 0 − α− = 0
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(A.8)

A1.3. Optimal Weight Matrix for GMM
We follow Erickson and Whited (2002) in computing the optimal weight matrix Ω̂−1
from the following formula for clustered covariance:

n
T
1 X X
Ω̂ =
ψh(xi,t ))
nT

!

t=1

i=1

T
X

!0
ψh(xi,t ))

(A.9)

t=1

in which ψh(xi,t ) is the vector of influence functions for the empirical moments h(xi,t ).
Deriving the influence functions for choice of moments is relatively straightforward. Take
any subset of h(xi,t ) and denote it as θ. For those moments that are obtained from simple
averages, i.e. θ̂ = E(xi ), the influence function can be computed simply as:

ψθ̂ (x) = x − E(X)

(A.10)

In the case of linear regression coefficients, we need to get influence function for the slope
and the constant. The slope is θ̂(β) =

Cov(X,Y )
Var(X) .

Then:


ψθ̂(β) (x, y) =
=

(x − E(X)) (y − E(Y )) − Cov(X, Y )
−
Var(X)


(x − E(X))2 − Var(X) Cov(X, Y )
(Var(X))2

=

(x − E(X)) (y − E(Y )) − β (x − E(X))
(x − E(X))
=
[(y − E(Y )) − β (x − E(X))]
Var(X)
Var(X)

2

)
E(XY )E(X)−(E(X))
The constant is instead θ̂(α) = E(y) − Cov(X,Y
Var(X) E(x) = E(y) −
Var(X)

ψθ̂(α) (x, y) = −

E(Y )

(xy − E(XY )) E(X) + (x − E(X)) E(XY ) − (y − E(Y )) (E(X))2 − 2 (x − E(X)) E(X)E(Y )

+y − E(Y ) +

−

Var(X)



(x − E(X))2 − Var(X)
E(XY )E(X) − (E(X))2 E(Y )
(Var(X))2

(xy − yE(X)) E(X) + (x − E(X)) (Cov(XY ) − E(X)E(Y ))
Var(X)
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−

+

= y − E(Y )−



(x − E(X))2 − Var(X)
(Var(X))2

. Then:

Finally, we use the ratio of regression coefficients. Take the ratio of slopes θ̂(βg /βb ). Then
by the chain rule:

ψθ̂(βg /βb ) (xg , yg , xb , yb ) =

ψθ̂(α) (xg , yg )βb − ψθ̂(α) (xb , yb )βg
βb2

And similarly, one can obtain the influence function for the ratio of constants.
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(A.11)

A1.4. Additional Figures
Figure A1.1: Net Cost of College

Figure A1.2: Student Debt Burden

Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 1993/94, 2000/01, 2007/08
and 2015/16 Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study (B&B:93/94, B&B:2000/01, B&B:2007/08,
B&B:2015/16). Figure A1.1 shows student budget minus all grants for graduating seniors and Figure A1.2
shows graduate’s monthly student loan payment as a percent of their monthly income.
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Figure A1.3: Graduate School Attainment

Source: CPS-ASEC supplement (age 35-40), percentage of Bachelor’s Degree graduates with a postBachelor’s Degree. Line represents smoothed trend.
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Figure A1.4: Model Identification
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Figure A1.5: Graduate School Educated Workers and Downpayment Constraint
Disposable Income Distribution by Age: Graduate School
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A1.5. Additional Tables
Table A1.1: Homeownership by Educational Attainment (1980-1994 cohorts)

Homeownership for post-BA graduates
age 25

age 30

age 35

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.150∗∗

-0.056∗∗∗

-0.005

[0.028]

[0.018]

[0.018]

Cohort and State FE

Y

Y

Y

Individual Controls

Y

Y

Y

3,264

4,281

2,720

Graduate School

Observations

Source: CPS 2005-2020 (males, with a BA degree or higher).

Table A1.2: Homeownership by Educational Attainment (1965-1979 cohorts)

Homeownership for post-BA graduates
age 25

age 30

age 35

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.06∗

-0.032∗∗

-0.006

[0.036]

[0.011]

[0.015]

Cohort and State FE

Y

Y

Y

Individual Controls

Y

Y

Y

2,796

4,747

6,512

Graduate School

Observations

Source: CPS 1992-2014 (males, with a BA degree or higher).
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A2.1. Data
This section describes in more detail the variables used in Section Section 2.3.
Cohort Definition and Weights:
Earnings and Graduation Rates cohorts: earnings measures are based on the universe
of Title IV students in a given entry cohort at each college. Graduation rates are based on
the set of full-time first-time students in a given entry cohort at each institution. To reduce
variability, cohorts are pooled across two years.
College weight: total number of undergraduate degree-seeking students attending for
the first time at the institution. Includes students enrolled in academic or occupational
programs. Also includes students enrolled in the fall term who attended college for the first
time in the prior summer term, and students who entered with advanced standing (college
credits earned before graduation from high school). Weights are pooled across two years.
Variables:
Median Earnings (in 2018 Dollars): median earnings among workers (i.e., among those
with positive yearly earnings) 6 to 10 years after first enrolling in an institution. Individuals
who are identified as currently enrolled (determined by having a federal loan that is in inschool deferment) are excluded from the calculation. To reduce variability, data are pooled
across two years. Earnings 6 years after enrollment are observed in 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009,
2011-2014. Earnings 10 years after enrollment are observed in 2007, 2009, 2011-2014.
Graduation rates: institutions report (via the IPEDS Graduation Rates component) on
the completion rates for full-time, first-time students who complete within 100 or 150 percent
of the expected time to completion. To reduce variability from year to year, graduation
rates are pooled across two years on a rolling basis. Graduation rates are observed for the
full panel.
97

Carnegie Classification: the Carnegie Foundation classifies institutions in several ways.
I use the basic classification and classify colleges in three categories: Doctoral Universities
(Very High Research Activity, High Research Activity, Doctoral/Professional Universities),
Master’s Colleges Universities (Larger Programs, Medium Programs and Small Programs)
and Baccalaureate Colleges (Arts Sciences Focus, Diverse Fields and Mixed Baccalaureate/Associate’s). I drop Associate’s and Special focus and other colleges.
ACT (American College Testing Program) score: the ACT assessment program
measures educational development and readiness to pursue college-level coursework in English, mathematics, natural science, and social studies. The data include the 25th and 75th
percentiles of ACT composite score. I use the midpoint of the 25th and 75th percentile. I
drop colleges with a midpoint lower than 15.
Net tuition revenue per FTE student (in 2018 Dollars): Tuition and fees are revenues from all tuition and fees assessed against students (net of refunds and discounts
allowances) for educational purposes. If tuition or fees are remitted to the state as an offset
to the state appropriation, the total of such tuition or fees should be deducted from the total
state appropriation and added to the total for tuition and fees. If an all-inclusive charge
is made for tuition, board, room, and other services, a reasonable distribution is made between revenues for tuition and fees and revenues for auxiliary enterprises. Tuition and fees
excludes charges for room,board, and other services rendered by auxiliary enterprises. FTE
enrollment covers the 12-month period ending June 30 prior to the IPEDS collection year.
Instructional Expenditure per FTE student (in 2018 Dollars): total expenses is
the sum of all operating expenses associated with the colleges, schools, departments, and
other instructional divisions of the institution and for departmental research and public
service that are not separately budgeted. This would include compensation for academic
instruction, occupational and vocational instruction, community education, preparatory
and adult basic education, and remedial and tutorial instruction conducted by the teaching
faculty for the institution’s students. FTE enrollment covers the 12-month period ending
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June 30 prior to the IPEDS collection year. I drop colleges with expenditure per FTE
student lower than $100. For the regression analysis, I use a 6 year average of expenditure
per student.
Selectivity: ratio of applicants to admitted students. Applicant: An individual who has
fulfilled the institution’s requirements to be considered for admission (including payment
or waiving of the application fee, if any) and who has been notified of one of the following
actions: admission, nonadmission, placement on waiting list, or application withdrawn (by
applicant or institution). Admitted: applicants that have been granted an official offer to
enroll in a college or university.
Endowment assets (in 2018 Dollars): consists of gross investments of endowment funds,
term endowment funds, and funds functioning as endowment for the institution and any of
its foundations and other affiliated organizations.
Percent of low-income and high-income students: percentage of aided students whose
family income is between $0-$30,000 (low-income), percentage of aided students with family
incomes higher than $75,001 in nominal dollars (high-income).
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A2.2. Additional Figures
Figure A2.1: College Enrollment and Attainment (2-year colleges)

Source: IPEDS/College Scorecard and CPS-ASEC supplement. Figure includes first-time undergraduate
students enrolled in a predominantly Associate’s Degree granting institution and individuals aged 25-30
with an Associate’s degree. Line represents smoothed trend.

Figure A2.2: Earnings Inequality (10 years after enrollment)
(a) Gini and ratio of percentiles

(b) Gini (by sector)

Source: College Scorecard Data. College-level median earnings are weighted using total first-time undergraduate degree-seeking students.
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Figure A2.3: Gini Coefficient (by region)

Source: College Scorecard Data. College-level median earnings are weighted using total first-time undergraduate degree-seeking students.
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Figure A2.4: Earnings, Expenditure per Student, ACT Score (2014)
(a) Expenditure (public)

(b) Expenditure (private non-profit)

(c) ACT score (public)

(d) ACT score (private non-profit)

Source: College Scorecard Data. Data is weighted using total first-time undergraduate degree-seeking enrollment (10 years before).
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Figure A2.5: Evolution of College Ratios (without upper and lower percentile)
(a) ∆ys,t (6 years after enrollment)

(b) ∆ys,t (10 years after enrollment)

(c) ∆xs,t

(d) ∆as,t

(e) ∆ts,t

(f) ∆Ss,t
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Figure A2.6: Evolution of College Ratios (doctoral vs. non-doctoral)
(a) ∆ys,t (6 years after enrollment)

(b) ∆ys,t (10 years after enrollment)

(c) ∆xs,t

(d) ∆as,t

(e) ∆ts,t

(f) ∆Ss,t
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Figure A2.7: Evolution of College Ratios (without grouping by sector)
(a) ∆yt (6 years after enrollment)

(b) ∆yt (10 years after enrollment)

(c) ∆xt

(d) ∆at

(e) ∆tt

(f) ∆St
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Figure A2.8: International Students Enrollment

Source: College Scorecard and IPEDS.
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Figure A2.9: Evolution of Endowment per Student (4-year colleges)

Source: College Scorecard and IPEDS.
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A2.3. Additional Tables
Table A2.1: Gini Coefficient (by states)
State

% Enrolled

4-y Colleges

2003

Gini
2014

2014

2014

GA

0.101

0.144

2.19%

30

DC

0.098

0.141

0.63%

MA

0.097

0.126

NC

0.074

PA

State

% Enrolled

4-y Colleges

2003

Gini
2014

2014

2014

OR

0.06

0.074

1.14%

18

8

OH

0.063

0.0744

4.43%

52

3.37%

50

WA

0.045

0.069

1.69%

18

0.125

3.21%

44

FL

0.046

0.067

3.65%

33

0.101

0.122

5.86%

85

WV

0.076

0.059

0.80%

14

SC

0.08

0.121

1.73%

30

NM

0.037

0.054

0.46%

8

MO

0.087

0.116

2.26%

36

UT

0.033

0.052

0.90%

5

NY

0.090

0.116

6.97%

99

MN

0.048

0.049

1.79%

29

ME

0.099

0.116

0.47%

15

MT

0.039

0.048

0.50%

9

MD

0.066

0.110

1.34%

20

NE

0.049

0.048

0.84%

16

NH

0.060

0.110

0.80%

9

HI

0.051

0.047

0.27%

6

VA

0.089

0.103

3.11%

36

IA

0.034

0.045

1.44%

26

IN

0.084

0.101

3.16%

38

SD

0.045

0.039

0.39%

9

MI

0.073

0.099

3.38%

33

KS

0.035

0.039

1.09%

21

IL

0.074

0.098

3.44%

50

ND

0.053

0.026

0.41%

8

CA

0.061

0.095

9.07%

74

AZ

0.026

0.025

1.47%

5

NJ

0.046

0.094

1.98%

22

ID

0.034

0.007

0.47%

6

AL

0.072

0.093

1.91%

25

AK

-

-

0.20%

3

RI

0.053

0.091

0.66%

7

DE

-

-

0.38%

3

CO

0.067

0.090

1.78%

15

WY

-

-

0.11%

1

CT

0.055

0.088

1.29%

17

NV

-

-

0.51%

3

AR

0.063

0.086

0.96%

15

TX

0.070

0.085

6.82%

63

LA

0.081

0.079

1.68%

19

TN

0.062

0.078

2.15%

31

VT

0.061

0.077

0.36%

12

KY

0.060

0.076

1.75%

26

OK

0.055

0.076

1.24%

19

MS

0.08

0.075

0.89%

14

WI

0.05

0.074

2.35%

33

Source: College Scorecard Data and IPEDS.
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Table A2.2: College Quality Estimates (ACT and by sector)
6 Years after enrollment

10 Years after enrollment

PACT >50%

Public

Private

PACT >50%

Public

Private

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.10∗∗∗

0.10∗∗∗

0.10∗∗∗

0.10∗∗∗

0.11∗∗∗

0.09∗∗∗

[0.006]

[0.008]

[0.007]

[0.007]

[0.009]

[0.009]

0.57∗∗∗

0.58∗∗∗

0.62∗∗∗

0.67∗∗∗

0.65∗∗∗

0.58∗∗∗

[0.032]

[0.036]

[0.035]

[0.041]

[0.043]

[0.048]

-0.04∗∗∗

-0.06∗∗∗

-0.09∗∗∗

-0.04∗∗∗

-0.05∗∗∗

-0.08∗∗∗

[0.011]

[0.011]

[0.012]

[0.014]

[0.016]

[0.016]

Sector and Cohort FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

State and Carnegie FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Students Controls

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

0.77

0.77

0.76

0.80

0.86

0.80

2,310

1,688

2,774

1,263

774

1,272

ν

α1

α2

Adj. R-squared
Observations
Standard errors in brackets.

Source: College Scorecard Data. Regressions are weighted using total first-time undergraduate degreeseeking enrollment.
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Table A2.3: College Quality Estimates (graduation rate)
Graduation Rate
6 years after enrollment

8 years after enrollment

τ =6

τ =8

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.06∗∗∗

0.03∗∗∗

0.04∗∗∗

0.06∗∗∗

0.035∗∗∗

0.04∗∗∗

[0.002]

[0.002]

[0.002]

[0.002]

[0.002]

[0.002]

1.00∗∗∗

1.07∗∗∗

0.84∗∗∗

0.95∗∗∗

1.02∗∗∗

0.83∗∗∗

[0.009]

[0.008]

[0.009]

[0.001]

[0.009]

[0.010]

-0.041∗∗∗

-0.017∗∗∗

-0.011∗∗

-0.041∗∗∗

-0.024∗∗∗

-0.015∗∗∗

[0.004]

[0.003]

[0.003]

[0.004]

[0.004]

[0.004]

Sector and Cohort FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

State and Carnegie FE

N

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Students Controls

N

N

Y

N

N

Y

0.78

0.85

0.88

0.77

0.85

0.87

10,187

10,187

9,811

8,083

8,083

7,796

ν

α1

α2

Adj. R-squared
Observations

Standard errors in brackets.

Source: College Scorecard Data. Regressions are weighted using total first-time undergraduate degreeseeking enrollment.
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